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ABSTRACT 
Through the Eyes of the Post: American Media Coverage of the 
Armenian Genocide 
 
by 
Jessica L. Taylor 
 
Many historians refer to the Armenian Genocide of 1915 as the 
first genocide of the twentieth century. In the context of the 
first global war, the Armenians of the Ottoman Empire were 
systematically persecuted and many eliminated while the world 
watched. Yet today, American memory and conception of the 
Armenian Genocide is remarkably different from similar 
historical events such as the Holocaust. The Armenian Genocide 
and America’s reaction to it is a forgotten event in American 
memory.    
  
In an attempt to better understand this process of forgetting, 
this thesis analyzes the Washington Post’s news coverage of the 
Armenian Genocide. By cataloguing, categorizing, and analysizing 
this news coverage, this thesis suggests Americans had 
sufficient information about the events and national reaction to 
it to form a memory. Therefore, the reasons for twenty-first 
century collective loss of memory in the minds of Americans must 
be traced to other sources.  
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 “The breath and intensity of American 
engagement in the effort to save the Armenians of 
the Ottoman Empire is an important chapter in 
American history, one that has been lost.   
 
       -Peter Balakain  
 
 
 Literature and research on the Armenian Genocide of World 
War I is extensive. Authors, journalists, historians, political 
scientists, and humanitarians have publicized, analyzed, and 
debated over the intent, implementation, consequences, and 
responsibility for the massacres. Armenian survivors have 
published memoirs, telling the stories of how their people and 
culture were killed. Hollywood has made movies recounting the 
experiences of survivors. Yet, in spite of the substantial 
amount of information available on the genocide, American memory 
of the event is disproportionately small. When compared to the 
Holocaust, a similar genocide of a religious minority group in 
the context of a world war, Americans know and learn little 
about the Armenian Genocide. There is currently no American 
Genocide memorial in Washington D.C,1 while the United States 
Holocaust Memorial Museum has been open for sixteen years, 
boasts thirty million visitors annually, and a website with 
                                                
 1 The Armenian Genocide Memorial of America is currently under 
construction in Washington DC, with an anticipated opening date of 2011.   
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information in over twenty languages serving online visitors 
from over one hundred countries.2 Research currently available on 
university courses on the Armenian Genocide reveals few American 
universities include stand alone courses or content within 
genocide courses about the Armenians.3 The failure of the 
Armenian Genocide Resolution to pass in the United States House 
of Representatives in 2007 received minimal attention or public 
reaction.  
 Still, the contemporary relevance of the Armenian Genocide 
can be seen in its influence on the diplomatic relations between 
the United States and Turkey and in similar humanitarian crises 
such as in Darfur. Historians still today attempt to combat the 
ignorance and apathy of Americans through the publication of 
books like The Burning Tigris, a New York Times best seller in 
2003, which details America’s humanitarian response to the 
Genocide.  
 The current state of American memory and conception of the 
Armenian Genocide raises a number of issues and questions. Have 
Americans forgotten about the Armenian Genocide? Did Americans 
know of the Armenian Genocide at the time of its occurrence? In 
what context did Americans learn about the Armenian Genocide? 
                                                
 
2
 “About the Museum,” United States Holocaust Memorial Museum, 
http://www.ushmm.org/museum/mission/ (accessed February 25, 2009).  
 3 Christina Pelosky, “Content Analysis of Undergraduate Courses and 
Course Content on the Armenian Genocide in United States Higher Education” 
(doctoral dissertation, Lynn University, 2005), 86-92.   
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How did Americans react to knowledge of the Armenian Genocide 
and did they respond with action?  
 Answering questions about the Armenian Genocide must first 
begin with a definition and framework of genocide. Crimes 
against humanity have existed in many forms throughout human 
history, and for centuries genocide was “a crime without a 
name.”4 A Polish-Jewish jurist by the name of Ralph Lemkin coined 
the term genocide during World War II to describe the Nazi 
campaigns against the Jews, years after the crimes committed 
against the Armenians had taken place. Lemkin made it his life’s 
work to secure a convention against genocide from the newly 
formed United Nations after World War II. He succeeded with the 
1948 adoption of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment 
of the Crime of Genocide.5 Today it is the UN Convention’s 
definition that defines international law concerning cases of 
genocide. 
  Regardless of the international legal framings of 
genocide, historians and social scientists continue to define 
genocide in light of “ambiguities of the Genocide Convention and 
its constituent debates.”6 Genocide frameworks vary in the 
                                                
 4 James T. Fussell, “A Crime Without a Name,” Prevent Genocide 
International, February 11, 2004, 
http://www.preventgenocide.org/genocide/crimewithoutaname.htm (accessed April 
4, 2009).  
 
5
 Adam Jones, Genocide: A Comprehensive Introduction (London: Routledge, 
2006), 8-11.  
 
6
  Jones, 15.  
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position they take on key concepts such as victim, agent, scale, 
strategy, and intent. Minor variations in the terminology can 
drastically alter the breath of an author’s definition of 
genocide. The exact definition of genocide is crucial when 
making decisions to apply the term to specific historical 
events, and as ambiguities in the definition opens the door to 
the claims of genocide deniers and rationalizes. The definition 
of genocide used for this study is borrowed from Adam Jones and 
is as follows: Genocide is “the actualization of the intent, 
however successfully carried out, to murder in whole or in 
substantial part any national, ethnic, racial, religious, 
political, social, gender or economic group, as these groups are 
defined by the perpetrator, by whatever means.”7  
 Based on the elements of this definition, the term genocide 
is applied in this study to the case of the Armenians. Use of 
the term genocide to label the mass killing of Armenians in 
World War I began almost immediately following the coining of 
the word. Since then the word has become the symbolic rope in an 
ongoing intellectual tug-of-war between pro-Armenian and pro-
Turkish writers, as if absence of the word in some way erases 
the reality of the massive loss of life. Intent has become the 
central issue in the debate among scholars concerning the use of 
the term genocide. Pinpointing the exact moment of intent in the 
                                                
 
7
 Jones, 22; italics in the original.  
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perpetration of genocide is extremely difficult though, as 
genocidal intent often escalates over time and is not always the 
result of a clearly discernable shift.8 Still, the term genocide 
is easily defendable as applicable to the case of the Armenians, 
and “the important thing, however, is not the term, but rather 
the moral position that recognizes the crime and condemns it.”9  
 Use of the term genocide does however raise two points of 
concern. First as the term genocide was not in existence at the 
time of the crimes against the Armenians, it is nowhere present 
in news reports, including those of the Washington Post, which 
is the basis for this study. As the Post readers learned about 
the violent persecution of the Armenians occurring during the 
course of World War I, they did not have the luxury of 
historical perspective available today. The true genocidal 
nature of the events may not have been clear as they were 
unfolding in the media coverage. Consequently the term genocide 
will be used sparingly to refer to the events as described in 
actual newspaper articles. Instead terms such as massacre or 
persecution will be used as a descriptive label. Similarly, a 
second point of concern is the connotation of the terms massacre 
or persecution. In the case of this thesis, the terms massacre 
                                                
 
8
 Donald Bloxham, The Great Game of Genocide: Imperialism, Nationalism 
and the Destruction of the Ottoman Armenians (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2005), 96.  
 
9
 Taner Açkam, A Shameful Act: The Armenian Genocide and the Question of 
Turkish Responsibility (New York: Metropolitan Books, 2006), 9.  
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and persecution are not used to define any crime against the 
Armenians in the singular sense or as alternative options to the 
term genocide. Instead, the terms are used to describe numerous 
individual events that all combined to make up a whole event, 
which here is discussed historically as the Armenian Genocide.   
 To begin looking at American conception of the Armenian 
Genocide, it is necessary to first recognize at least some 
American familiarity with the Armenians prior to World War I. 
The American public was first introduced to the Armenians of 
Ottoman Turkey almost a century before the First World War began 
through foreign missionary organizations. The American Board of 
Commissioners for Foreign Missions arose out of the social 
forces of the Second Great Awakening and emphasized the spread 
of Christianity to every region of the world. Its first 
missionaries arrived in Turkey in the 1820s and established the 
foundation for mission work that would last over a hundred 
years. Missionaries published accounts of their experiences in 
the Near East through memoirs and biographies in which they 
introduced the American public to the minority peoples and 
culture of Turkey. The authors often idealized the subjects of 
their efforts, and the result was “both an enlarged store of 
knowledge and a romantic perception of the Near East.”10  
                                                
 10  Joseph L. Grabill, Protestant Diplomacy and the Near East: Missionary 
Influence on American Policy, 1810-1927 (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota 
Press, 1971), 39 
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 American mission work in Turkey incorporated an educational 
element into their efforts, establishing schools for Christian 
minority groups throughout the country. By 1914, America had 
developed the largest network of schools of any country, 
concentrated primarily in Anatolia among the Armenians. As the 
missionary presence in the Ottoman Empire grew throughout the 
nineteenth century, so to did the mission groups’ influence on 
American policy. The internationalism of mission work, however, 
“contrasted with the political isolationism of the United States 
government.”11 American diplomats in Turkey were chiefly 
concerned with protecting American citizens, and the United 
States State Department worked to gain concessions and 
exemptions for Americans from Ottoman law and protection of 
American property and investments in Turkey.12 The American 
missionary presence in the Ottoman Empire helped to publicize a 
romantic view of the Armenians, which was a firmly established 
by the eve of World War I.  
 When the First World War began, American access to 
information about the Armenians was supplemented by the American 
Ambassador to Turkey, Henry Morgenthau. Appointed by President 
Wilson, and arriving in Constantinople just months before the 
outbreak of the war, Morgenthau became the eyes and ears of the 
                                                
 11 Grabill, 38.   
 
12
 Grabill, 1-39.  
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United States government for information regarding the massacre 
of Armenians. The United States neutrality during the early war 
years allowed for ongoing diplomatic relations with Turkey until 
April 1917, when Turkey broke relations only at the behest of 
Germany.13 During that time, Morgenthau had access to information 
about the Armenians that the Allied countries did not. He 
received dispatches from American consuls from around the 
Ottoman Empire and passed them on to the State Department. When 
the massacre of Armenians began, the Ottoman government cut the 
cable wires from Anatolia and censored diplomatic 
communications. American consuls were forced to find secret ways 
to transmit messages and use a shorthand code to conceal the 
content. American missionaries smuggled letters and eyewitness 
accounts the American embassy to be passed along to the State 
Department. Morgenthau used the dispatches he received, 
combining information on his own experiences and insights, to 
confirm reports about the massacres circulating in the American 
press. Accurate and detailed information about the atrocities 
also made its way to relief organizations to be used as fuel to 
mobilize relief efforts.14 The varied access to information about 
                                                
 13 Robert L. Daniel, “The Armenian Question and American-Turkish 
Relations, 1914-1927,” The Mississippi Valley Historical Review 46, no. 2 
(Sept 1959), 257.  
 
14
 Peter Balakian, The Burning Tigris: The Armenian Genocide and 
America’s Response ( New York: Perennial, 2003), 224, 252, 267, 286.  
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the Armenians made Americans some of the most informed citizens 
in the world during the early war years.  
 This thesis will make use of media coverage from the 
Washington Post as a case study to examine the prominence and 
presentation of news stories on the Armenian Genocide. As a 
national daily newspaper at the pulse of American politics, the 
Post’s treatment of the Armenian Genocide can provide insight on 
the way in which American citizens and political leaders in the 
nation’s capital were first exposed to the tragic massacres. The 
Post was founded in 1877 by Stilson Hutchins. Initially destined 
to be a democratic daily among the southern sympathies in the 
nation’s capital, Huthcins had aspirations for the paper to gain 
the ear of some of the most powerful men in the country. The 
first edition appeared on December 6, was four pages, and was 
sold at three cents.15  
 By the time the First World War began in Europe, the Post 
was boasting a twelve page weekday edition and a seventy-four 
page Sunday edition. In August 1914 the paper ran a triple eight 
column headline announcing the news of European hostilities. 
Most American dailies of the early twentieth century did not 
maintain staff correspondents in international news centers but 
                                                
 15 Chalmers McGeagh Roberts, The Washington Post: The First 100 Years 
(Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1977), 3-9.  
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instead depended on press associations for outside information,16 
and the Post was no exception. The Post had no foreign 
correspondents and relied on dispatches from the Associated 
Press or International News Service to cover the war.17 From the 
start of the war, the Post strongly advocated American 
neutrality and strived to present the German side of the war 
despite the inaccessibility of information from Germany. Once it 
became clear the United States would enter the war, the Post 
became a supporter of the war effort until the end.18  
 News about the massacre of Armenians began almost 
immediately following their outbreak, giving Americans current 
and ongoing updates. The Washington Post’s reporting of the 
Armenian Genocide had the potential to influence readers’ 
impression of the massacres. The media coverage also had the 
potential to sway American reaction for or against American 
intervention in Turkey. The purpose of this thesis is to examine 
a small component of American memory of the Armenian Genocide in 
an effort to begin answering the broader questions about the 
current state of American consciousness. Memory begins with a 
foundation. American media coverage during the course of the 
Armenian Genocide provided part of that foundation. Media 
                                                
 
16
 Edwin Emery and Michael Emery, The Press and America: An 
Interpretative History of the Mass Media, 6th ed. (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice 
Hall, 1988), 282.  
 
17
 Roberts, 56.  
 
18
 Emery and Emery, 294; Roberts, 125-128, 136-138.  
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coverage can not only inform readers but also report on and 
shape their opinions. The content and vocabulary of the 
reporting can develop a framework for understanding historical 
events. Analysis of the media coverage of the Armenian Genocide 
can establish a context of how and what Americans learned about 
the event.  
 News coverage, as opposed to diplomatic correspondence or 
official communications, has implications for drawing 
conclusions about average Americans. News accounts were 
accessible and intelligible to ordinary people. In addition to 
offering a context for learning about the massacres, media 
coverage offers an understanding of American’s reaction to the 
events through reports on relief work and political action. From 
this perspective, questions on American comprehension of the 
Armenian Genocide can begin to be answered.  
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CHAPTER 2 
HISTORICAL BACKGROUND 
 
Armenians in Ottoman Turkey 
 
 The Armenians of Turkey are a Christian minority group with 
a rich cultural history. Known to have been one of the earliest 
groups to convert to Christianity, the ancient Armenian nation 
is also possibly the first state to have officially accepted the 
religion. The geographic core of the Armenian ancestral homeland 
has at various times throughout history been located on the 
frontier of numerous empires, causing the group to suffer as a 
result. The last great Armenian kingdom of Cilicia fell in 1375 
to the Mamluks. The rise of the Ottoman dynasty in Anatolia in 
the fourteenth century began a period of Turkish control of the 
Armenians which lasted until the early twentieth century.  
 Soon after the Ottoman conquest of the Constantinople in 
1453, Sultan Mehmet II brought Armenians, along with other 
religious and ethnic minority groups, to settle the new capital. 
As the Empire expanded its reach in Anatolia toward the Black 
Sea region, it incorporated more and more Armenians. The 
Ottomans dealt with the diverse populations it was absorbing by 
organizing non-Muslim peoples into millets or officially 
recognized communities. The millet system was not a static 
 19
institution but instead evolved over time, and use of the term 
millet to describe the formal organization of a semi-autonomous 
religious community was not common until the early nineteenth 
century.19 Religion was the defining characteristic of the millet 
system, as opposed to language or shared origin, as the basis of 
society. Millets were ruled indirectly by the Ottoman state, 
preferring instead to pass down administrative authority to the 
religious head of the millet.20 The communities were allowed to 
organize themselves around their own religious laws under the 
“jurisdiction of diverse patriarchates,”21 which controlled many 
civic aspects of the community’s organization. A by-product of 
the millet system was that the ethnic and religious minority 
groups in the Ottoman Empire were able to maintain their 
heritage in the form of their language, culture, and traditions, 
free from the threat of forced assimilation. While the various 
millets held a semi-autonomous status for administrative 
purposes, their members did not share equality with Muslim 
subjects. The multi-ethnic nature of the Ottoman state meant it 
could not rely on a shared language or culture among its people 
                                                
 19 For further explanation on the definition and evolution of the millet 
system see Benjamin Braude “Foundation of Myth of the Millet System,” in 
Christians and Jews in the Ottoman Empire: The Functioning of a Plural 
Society, vol. 2, ed. Benjamin Braude and Bernard Lewis (New York: Holmes and 
Meier Publishers, 1982), 69-87; and Roderic Davison, “The Millets as Agents 
of Change in the Nineteenth-Century Ottoman Empire,” also in Christians and 
Jews in the Ottoman Empire, vol. 2, ed. Braude and Lewis, 319-321.  
 20 Ronald Suny, “Empire and Nation: Armenians, Turks and the End of the 
Ottoman Empire,” Armenian Forum 1, no. 2 (1998), 24.  
 21 Stephan Astourian, “The Armenian Genocide: An Interpretation,” The 
History Teacher 23, no. 2 (Feb 1990), 117.  
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for stability. Instead of attempting to “break down the 
boundaries of these communities and homogenize the population of 
the empire...around a single identity,”22 the traditional Ottoman 
policy was to use “distinctions of hierarchy between rulers and 
ruler, Muslim and non-Muslim,”23 to organize society. 
Institutionalized inequality for all non-Muslims subjects became 
the method of social organization in the Empire.  
 It was within these distinctions of hierarchy that the 
Armenian Christians lived as unequal citizens, and civil 
oppression characterized their existence. The religious freedoms 
enjoyed by non-Muslims concerned only their private status; in 
the civil sector they did not enjoy equal rights with Muslims. 
They were denied the right to serve in many government posts,24 
and often they had to wear distinctive clothing or certain 
colors to denote them as non-Muslims.25 Non-Muslims were free 
from conscription in the Ottoman military, a desired freedom, 
but only in exchange for payment of a head tax placed on all 
non-Muslim males. As a result “there came into being two 
societies, Muslim and non-Muslim, which did not have equal 
                                                
 
22
 Suny, 24. 
 
23
 Suny, 25.  
 24 Carter Findley, “The Acid Test of Ottomanism: The Acceptance of Non-
Mushms in the Late Ottoman Bureaucracy,” in Christians and Jews in the 
Ottoman Empire, vol. 2, ed. Braude and Lewis, 339.  
 25 H. Alojian, “Origins of the Armenian Colony in Constantinople,” 
Armenian Review VII, no. 2 (1954), 119.  
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rights.”26 As long as the Ottoman Empire was content with a non-
homogenous society, the Armenians continued a stable existence 
of inequality.  
 Still the civil oppression characteristic of the millet 
system was not without its benefits to the Armenian community. 
The religious freedom it provided within the community allowed 
the Armenian Church to maintain a place of authority, and its 
role as the centralizing force in the Armenian community grew 
between the fifteenth and nineteenth centuries.27 As Muslim 
charitable and welfare organizations revolved around religion, 
the Armenians had to supplement their community with similar 
institutions, thus creating a vast charitable network. The 
nature of the millet system fostered a tight knit community, 
which allowed for the preferential treatment of community 
members in industry. Armenians were excluded from areas where 
they might accrue influence, so they turned to other 
professions. As they were limited to a smaller number of 
professions, they were able to specialize and become highly 
qualified in those areas. They climbed the economic ladder and 
accrued wealth and power. In this context, “whatever 
                                                
 
26
 Enver Ziya Karal, “Non-Muslim Representatives in the First 
Constitutional Assembly, 1876-1877,” in Christians and Jews in the Ottoman 
Empire, vol. 2, ed. Braude and Lewis, 387.   
 
27
  Kevork B. Bardakjian “The Rise of the Armenian Patriarchate of 
Constantinople,” in Christians and Jews in the Ottoman Empire: The 
Functioning of a Plural Society, vol. 1, ed. Benjamin Braude and Bernard 
Lewis (New York: Holmes and Meier Publishers, 1982),96.  
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discriminations, abuses and inferiority the Armenians were 
forced to endure must be weighed alongside the considerable 
benefits this cultural and political autonomy provided.”28  
 While the millet system allowed the Armenian community to 
prosper in many ways, it also created a social context for 
oppression with a wide range of severity. Suppression of civil 
rights, exclusion from the government, and the unequal legal 
status of a minority group are factors that can create an 
opportunity for further discrimination, even violent 
intolerance. In the organized suppression of a second class 
citizenry, massacre or genocide of a particular minority group 
can occur. The set of legal disabilities denying a minority 
institutional protection, and redress in the event of actual 
victimization, is “one of the foremost facts affording 
persecution in a sociopolitical system.”29 The millet system 
created just such a circumstance, and violent victimization 
eventually became the case for the Armenians in the Ottoman 
Empire.  
 Although the Armenian community in Turkey lived and 
prospered under Ottoman rule for centuries, the rise of Armenian 
and Greek millets to a place of economic strength by the mid-
nineteenth century gave members of these communities increased 
                                                
 
28
 Ronald Grigor Suny, Looking Toward Ararat: Armenia in Modern History 
(Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1993), 101.  
 
29
 Vahakn Dadrian, Warrant for Genocide: Key Elements of the Turko-
Armenian Conflict (New Brunswick: Transaction Publishers, 2003), 15.  
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wealth and power through industry, trade, and finance. Armenians 
excelled in mining, shipping, milling, clothing manufacturing, 
as well as banking and money lending, areas of the economy where 
the Turkish government was reluctant to increase its control. It 
was “in the absence of competition from members of the dominant 
group, the Armenian merchant class...attained a high degree of 
prosperity.”30 The characteristics of the millet system 
previously discussed were critical in these developments, and 
individuals used these circumstances to gain opportunities and 
prosperity in the economic sector. In addition Armenians had the 
help of coreligionists outside the Empire’s borders, the 
friendship of European states, and the advantages provided 
during the Ottoman reform era. As the economic control of the 
Ottoman government steadily declined, the Armenian community’s 
influence grew along side that of the European powers.31 
 As a result of the Armenian community’s increased economic 
strength and influence by the middle of the nineteenth century, 
the Armenian communities in Europe, as well as in Turkey, were 
considered in the height of an Armenian Renaissance. The 
Armenian Renaissance was a cultural revival of their history and 
civilization, which had distinct political overtones in the form 
                                                
 
30
 Vahakn N. Dadrian, “The Structural-Functional Components of Genocide: 
A Victimological Approach to the Armenian Case,” in Victimology, ed. Israel 
Drapkin and Emilio Viano (Toronto: Lexington Books, 1974), 127.  
 
31
 Charles Issawi, “The Transformation of the Economic Position of the 
Millets in the Nineteenth Century,” in Christians and Jews in the Ottoman 
Empire, vol. 2, ed. Braude and Lewis, 261-264.  
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of a growth of nationalistic sentiment. Beginning in the 
Diaspora with the Mekhitarist Congregation of Venice, founded in 
1701, advances such as the printing press, educational revival 
brought about through missionary activity, resurgence of 
nationalistic literature, and the modernization of the Armenian 
language all combined to create a ripe atmosphere for the growth 
of a large intelligentsia class. Similar in the European 
Renaissance, the popularity of vernaculars, codification of the 
Armenian vernacular, and translation of foreign classics, all 
important milestones in the rise of nationalism, helped to 
spread liberal ideals. This Armenian cultural awakening fed the 
fires of a strengthening independence movement and “wrought 
powerful changes in the community, the most significant of which 
was perhaps the sense of unity it stirred among the Armenians.”32  
 The nationalistic movement growing in the Armenian 
community as part of the Renaissance contained a democratic 
thread. The Armenian elite sent their children to European 
universities to be educated, and it was there that they learned 
about democracy, nationalism, and “the new western ideas of 
their time.”33 They brought these ideals back home and 
synthesized them with the cultural awakening, renewing their 
pride in Armenian history. Armenian leaders came to view a 
                                                
 
32
 Bardakjian, 96.  
 
33
 Bernard Lewis, The Emergence of Modern Turkey, 3rd ed (New York: 
Oxford University Press, 2002), 62. 
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democratic constitutional system with representatives elected by 
members of the millet as a crucial step in the move towards 
autonomy.34 An increase in Armenian nationalistic fervor was one 
of many factors that led to a decline in the centuries old 
harmonious relationship between the Armenians and the Turkish 
government. It challenged the basic foundation of Ottoman social 
and political dominance by confronting the “theory and practice 
of Muslim superiority and Armenian inferiority.”35 By fusing a 
distinct and independent culture within the Ottoman Empire with 
western political ideology, the Armenians challenged the heart 
of the Ottoman social order and aligned itself closer with 
European principles.36  
 At the same time the Armenian liberal intelligentsia was 
growing in strength and influence many eastern Anatolian 
Armenians of the lower classes suffered from Ottoman oppression. 
As the Ottoman Empire began steadily to decline in the last half 
of the nineteenth century, corruption in the government spread. 
Armenians now had to pay increased taxes to government tax 
collectors. As many Armenians in Anatolia lived in a sort of 
“feudal servitude” to their Kurdish neighbors, they suffered 
                                                
 
34
 Harry Jewell Sarkiss, “The Armenian Renaissance, 1500-1863,” The 
Journal of Modern History 9, no. 4 (Dec 1937), 433-448.  
 
35
 Robert Melson, “A Theoretical Inquiry into the Armenian Massacres of 
1894-1896,” Comparative Studies in Society and History 24, no. 3 (July 1982), 
506.  
 
36
 Simon Payaslian, The History of Armenia From Origins to the Present 
(New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007), 117-120.  
 26
from a dual taxation, one to the Ottoman government and the 
other to local Kurdish tribal leaders. When they defaulted on 
their payments to the Kurds, Armenian villages were attacked, 
looted, and pillaged as punishment. Armenians appealed to the 
Ottoman government for reform with little success. The situation 
continued to worsen in the years leading up to the turn of the 
century, and the European Powers used the situation as a 
strategy to increase their influence in the Ottoman state. This 
was a factor contributing to the deterioration of the Turko-
Armenian relationship.  
 
Armenians and the European Powers 
  
 From a European standpoint in the nineteenth century, the 
vulnerable status of the Armenians was part of a larger “Eastern 
Question.” The corruption and decline of the Ottoman Empire led 
to political power struggles among the European Powers over the 
geographical and political future of the Empire. The fate of 
Ottoman lands became a focus of international rivalries, 
competition for economic expansion, and the balance of European 
power. This conundrum became known as the Eastern Question,37 and 
the Armenians became “pawns in Europe’s struggle for power and 
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dominance.”38 Total collapse of the Ottoman Empire was 
potentially dangerous, given the competing interests, and so the 
general European consensus was to prop up the Empire. Yet the 
individual European Powers indulgenced in furthering their own 
causes. Russia focused on a slow erosion of Turkish territory, 
and continuously gave assistance to different religious groups 
or invaded the Balkan regions on the pretense of assisting 
Ottoman subjects. France and Great Britain wanted to curb 
Russia’s influence in the region; Britain valued increased 
influence in Persia and Egypt near its India colony, while 
France vied for power in Syria and Lebanon. In this way, 
“through their wars and support of the separatist goals of 
rebellious Ottoman subjects, European states abetted the very 
process of fragmentation that they feared, and were seeking to 
avoid.”39  
 Russia’s geographical proximity to Turkish Armenia gave her 
the opportunity to develop a special relationship with the 
Turkish Armenians, a relationship that was clouded by Russia’s 
expansionist aims. Russia had long dreamed of controlling the 
Straits, her only true access to the Mediterranean Sea. Gaining 
control of the Straits dominated Russia’s foreign policy and 
diplomacy with Turkey. In the late nineteenth century, when the 
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Turkish Armenian community was in a precarious situation, they 
believed their best chance for autonomy from the Ottoman 
government was with help from an outside power that would serve 
as their protector. Russia was a neighbor, had a large Armenian 
population within its borders, and had at times used its own 
Armenian population as a reason to increase its influence in the 
Ottoman Empire. The Ottoman government felt enormous pressure 
from Russia in the Balkans and on its eastern borders and was 
suspicious of Russia’s intentions toward Armenia.40  
 It was in the context of international rivalries that 
pressure from European powers for development and westernization 
helped to instigate Ottoman reforms. Foreign governments may 
have had differing motivations for desiring reform, yet all the 
Great Powers had a stake in the future of the Empire. 
Nationalist movements sprung up in many of the empire’s regions 
and weakened the state’s unity. The Sublime Porte41 hoped reform 
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would target the heart of nationalistic tendencies, and 
improvement of the status of non-Muslim citizens would 
circumvent further intervention of international powers under 
the guise of protector. In the attempt to stem this tide of 
internal decline and international pressure, the Ottoman 
government launched an era of reform during the nineteenth 
century. At the heart of the reforms was the equality of Muslim 
and non-Muslim subjects. As seen previously, the millet system 
kept non-Muslim communities segregated and at the bottom of the 
social hierarchy, and Ottoman reforms proposed to reverse this 
segregation. The reform era from 1839-1876, known as the 
Tanzimat (Reorganization), began with the Hatt-i Şerif of Gülhane 
proclamation in 1839 and culminated with the Constitution in 
1876. In the Hatt-i Şerif, Sultan Abdulmecid I proclaimed the 
equality of peoples of all religions and updated the military 
conscriptions laws to include non-Muslims. A second decree on 
February 18, 1856, the Hatti-i Humayun (Imperial Rescript), went 
even further to confirm the equality of all the Empire’s peoples 
and called for the reorganization of the state. The reform era 
culminated with the first written constitution, which 
established a limited monarchy over all Ottoman subjects 
regardless of religion.42 The radical reforms promulgated during 
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this reform era targeted the very core of Ottoman social 
organization and attempted to redefine social status as one 
based on secular loyalty to the state instead of religion.  
 For many reasons the implementation of Ottoman reform never 
reached as high as its promise. In many ways the reform measures 
were used as “weapons of diplomacy in times of international 
crisis,”43 instead of as genuine measures of change. The push for 
equality of all subjects went against a centuries old premise of 
the superiority of Muslims and Islam as the source of legitimacy 
for government. It meant a revision of the basis of citizenship 
from one of religion to one in which all citizens were equal in 
the eyes of the state. Such a change was a complex process, and 
the anticipated break with tradition was a traumatic shock to 
the Muslim psyche, one which many Muslims, and even Christians, 
lashed out against.44  
 Despite Ottoman attempts at reform, nationalistic movements 
among minority groups in the Empire continued to grow. Demands 
for equality evolved into demands for autonomy.45 These demands 
turned violent in the Balkan provinces in the spring of 1876, 
with the outbreak of a Balkan rebellion. Russia intervened 
militarily, and subsequently won a victory over the Ottomans, 
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drawing the attention of the other Great Powers. The Russian 
victory created a major crisis and sparked international 
tensions, as the fate of the Ottoman Empire became evident, and 
additionally brought the Armenian question into the 
international arena. For the Armenians, it presented an 
opportunity, but ultimate disappointment, on the road toward 
securing international protection. The Armenians hoped to use 
Russia’s newly enhanced political power as a chance to gain a 
protector. A petition addressed to Tsar Alexander II from the 
Armenian national assembly asked simply “What we now hope for, 
and what we are now so bold as to request, is that the form of 
administration granted to the Christians in Thrace should also 
be granted to the Armenians. The cries torn from our hearts 
would thus be heard and our miseries ended.”46 With former 
Russian ambassador to Turkey Grand Duke Nicolas Pavlovich 
Ignatiev to champion their cause, the Tsar instructed that the 
Armenian question be taken into consideration at the peace 
treaty negotiations to the surprise of the Ottomans. Article 16 
of the agreement addressed the Armenian issue but did not 
provide the Armenians with the independence they so desired. 
They had hoped Russia would support them to the fullest but were 
content that the article acknowledged the need for immediate 
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reforms in Armenia, and that its people were under threat from 
the Kurds and Circassians. In effect the Russian army was to 
oversee reforms and occupy the regions until the Porte had 
implemented the changes. This protection was an important step 
on the road to independence, and the Armenians were satisfied to 
have Russia as a protector.47  
 Yet, the advances made for the Armenians in the San Stefano 
Treaty were fleeting. International disapproval of the treaty 
forced revision of the agreements to include other European 
powers, to the detriment of the Armenians. Britain strongly 
opposed the severe terms placed on the Ottomans at San Stefano 
and feared Russian attempts to crush the Ottomans and partition 
the country. Britain strategically sent Indian troops to occupy 
Cyprus in order to force Russia to agree to revise the treaty and 
refer the Eastern Question to the Congress of Berlin.48 The Berlin 
Conference forced the European Powers to address the Armenian 
question. Reference to the Armenian Question in Article 16 of the 
San Stefano agreement was replaced by Article 61 of the Treaty of 
Berlin, an article that reduced the concessions given to the 
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Armenians under the former article and “disappointed the 
Armenians sorely.”49  
 After the Berlin Conference, the Armenians realized their 
biggest potential ally was too weak politically to truly help 
them, and their actions had critically injured their 
relationship with the Ottoman government. In addition, the Porte 
resisted implementation of the proposed reforms under Article 
61, while the European powers waned in enforcing them. In their 
frustration at the turn of events, the Armenians felt compelled 
to turn to extra-legal means of resistance. The limited reforms 
they had gained were never enforced, and conditions with their 
Kurdish neighbors were not improving.  
 Their frustration and disappointment, combined with the 
Armenian cultural awakening, became the ideological foundation 
for a revolutionary movement based on “emancipatory and 
revolutionary nationalism...and strategic thinking for the 
purpose of self defense.”50 In the early 1880s, these 
revolutionary movements began to spring up in the Diaspora and 
spread to Anatolia. Militant in nature, the new revolutionary 
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groups bolstered the morale in Armenian communities, which was 
low due to discrimination at the hands of Turkish oppressors. 
The martial arm of these organizations roamed the countryside, 
protecting the innocent and threatening regular Turkish army 
units and armed Kurds. They focused on providing a defense 
network and spreading revolutionary ideas about independence to 
the Armenian millet. These military groups represented 
frustration with the slow, diplomatic processes of reform and a 
desire for increased tangible protection against daily 
subjugation.  
 The Armenian Revolutionary Movement had several 
representative parties, the most prominent among them being the 
Armenian Revolutionary Federation, (also known as the Dashnaks) 
and the Hunchak Revolutionary Party. These groups and others 
were influenced by Marxist ideas and shared the general goal of 
increased autonomy for the Armenians. The different 
revolutionary groups often disagreed on their definition of 
reform goals and the means of implementing them and competed for 
support among the community. While the revolutionary movement 
gave the Armenian community a sense of empowerment, it also 
heightened tensions with the Kurds in the eastern provinces and 
the Porte. Armenian guerilla bands operating in the mountains 
and rugged terrain attacked Turkish military units and armed 
Kurdish bands. They assaulted Turkish villages and secretly 
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stockpiled arms for the Armenian population. However alarming 
the thought of armed Armenians was to the Porte, the 
revolutionary movements rarely had a large support base in the 
community. The revolutionary groups fought among each other over 
policy and had to employ heavy propaganda campaigns to sway 
Armenians to their point of view.51  
 The Porte viewed Armenian revolutionary activity with 
suspicion, particularly with regard to the Armenians in Anatolia, 
due to their close proximity to Russia. In light of the guerilla 
violence, Sultan Abdul Hamid II established gendarme cavalry 
units comprised of Kurdish volunteers, named the Hamidiye 
regiments, to patrol the region. The regiments gave the Kurds a 
considerable amount of authority, and the Porte restrained from 
censuring the regiments for excessive behaviors in an effort to 
encourage their loyalty to the government.52 Their role was to 
patrol the border regions and monitor the Armenians, Kurds, and 
Turkish nobles. Instead, the Armenians became their primary 
target, suffering the worst consequences.53 Armenian revolutionary 
activities and the presence of the Hamidiye regiments finally 
reached a climax in the summer of 1894. Armenians living in 
village of Sassoun, being overburdened by dual taxation and 
Kurdish attempts to take their land, ultimately rebelled. The 
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Armenian “insurrection,” as it was called by the Ottomans, was 
savagely put down by regular Turkish military, Hamidiye 
regiments, and Kurdish villagers in a manner that alerted the 
European powers.54 Russia, France, and Britain drafted a 
memorandum that included proposed reforms for the six provinces 
with Armenians populations in reaction to the events in Sassoun 
and sent it to the Porte in the spring of 1895. Pressure for 
reforms further inflamed tensions in eastern Anatolia, which were 
“seen as another example of European imperialism, one step on the 
road to Armenian independence,”55 and provoked further inter-
communal violence. As a result, the Ottoman government was slow 
to approve the reforms and even slower to enact proposed changes.   
 In the months following the European reform proposal, 
violent confrontations continued in Anatolia, consisting of the 
organized massacre of Armenians to suppress rebellion. The 
escalating brutality and delayed reforms provoked a response from 
Armenian revolutionary groups. In September 1895, an Armenian 
nationalist organization, the Hunchakist party, organized a 
protest march in Istanbul to accelerate the implementation of the 
reforms that the European powers had proposed to the sultan. The 
march ended in violence as crowds in the city reacted brutally to 
the protest and launched vicious outbursts against Armenians all 
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over the empire, especially in the vilayets where reforms were 
scheduled to take effect. The massacres intensified even further 
in August of 1896 when members of the Dashnak Revolutionary Party 
invaded the Imperial Ottoman Bank “with the aim of instigating 
foreign intervention.”56 This incident aggravated the tensions and 
launched a massive massacre of Armenians in the capital.57  
 The reasons for the 1894-1896 Armenian massacres must be 
understood within “the context of Armenian-Ottoman relations, and 
by the unintentional consequences of the Armenian renaissance.”58 
Robert Melson examines the theoretical framework for the 1894-
1896 massacres. He argues the Armenian Renaissance and the 
presence of so many Armenians near the border with a hostile 
neighbor, set in the context of the disintegration of the Ottoman 
Empire, can explain how the Porte came to view the Armenians as a 
threat. The increased economic power of the community, and 
strengthened nationalistic ideology as a result of the 
Renaissance, combined with Armenian connections in the Diaspora 
which enabled them to reach out to foreign powers for support, 
threatened the Ottoman government’s power. The weakening of the 
Empire forced the Porte to take drastic measures to keep the 
Empire from further disintegration, including suppression of 
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dissenters who threatened the historical status quo. Massacre was 
the means of choice to accomplish this goal.59  
 Additionally it is necessary to delineate the 1890s events 
as massacres and not genocide. The massacres were partial in 
nature, took place in urban centers, limiting the targets to men, 
and killing them outright in locations close to their home or 
business.  The killings lasted only a few days and generally 
began and ended abruptly, in some cases with the ringing of a 
bell. The intent was not the elimination of an entire ethnic 
group, as “there were no wholesale deportations and massacres, as 
the main purpose of these massacres involved large-scale 
economic, cultural, and psychological destruction through 
selective massacre.”60 Yet, while full scale genocide may not have 
been the intent, the 1890s massacres are a key turning point in 
the desperation felt by the Porte, and its willingness to condone 
violence as a method for unification and rejuvenation of the 
Empire.   
 The 1895 reforms the sultan announced as a result of the 
massacres and international pressure were never implemented. This 
left the Armenian question unresolved, making it a potential 
source of future conflict. Therefore, it is not surprising the 
1890s persecutions were only a precedent for additional massacres 
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to follow. In the last few years of the nineteenth century and 
the opening years of the twentieth, the decay of the Ottoman 
Empire continued. Ottoman liberals and intelligentsia created a 
movement that asserted that drastic change was needed to save the 
Empire from dissolution. Known as the Young Turk movement, it 
adopted western institutions and ideologies as a basis for change 
in an effort to protect against the encroaching West. The 
movement spouted democratic characteristics such as 
constitutional government and freedom from authoritarian sultans, 
all within the context of Turkish social customs. Although it 
started as a movement of reform, over time the ideals of 
nationalism and Turkish supremacy spread among the Young Turks 
and made it less and less appealing to ethnic and religious 
minority groups.61  
 In a virtually bloodless revolution, the Young Turk party, 
or the Committee of Union and Progress (CUP), came to power in 
July of 1908, forcing Sultan Abdul Hamid II to reinstate the 
constitution of 1876. In the initial days following the 
revolution, Armenian leaders of the Hunchak and Dashnak parties 
both supported the CUP and pledged cooperation. However, the wave 
of good feelings did not last as the CUP became increasingly 
devoted to the idea of Pan-Turkism. Pan-Turkism rejected liberal 
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ideals of equality of all Ottoman subjects, consequently 
excluding “Armenians not just from state power...but also from 
society at large.”62 As a result, Armenian communities worked to 
gather support in order to elect their own people to Parliament. 
They labored to amass backing for their independence movement and 
to revive nationalistic sentiment. Armenian leaders tried to 
entice CUP support, but the new leaders were distracted with 
problems in the Balkans and were at war almost immediately upon 
gaining power, thus giving little attention to the Armenian 
question.63  
 The Balkan Wars at the beginning of the twentieth century 
brought the Eastern Question and the future of the Ottoman Empire 
further into the international arena. Dissolution of the Empire 
began to seem more and more inevitable, and the European powers 
scrambled to ensure they would benefit from the decline of the 
Empire. The eastern border of the Empire was of great concern to 
both Russia and Great Britain for its strategic geographic 
proximity to trade with India and the Far East. Germany and 
France were also concerned with the future of the Ottoman Empire, 
as they had economic investments in the Empire. New political 
alliances with the Triple Entente and Triple Alliance brought 
further complications to the Armenian question, which had not 
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existed at the Berlin Conference. Foreign concern over the 
Armenians was a symptom of international tensions and rivalry 
early in the century, but none of the Powers “wanted partition at 
the moment, and none wanted war at the moment over the Armenian 
question.”64 Reform in Turkey became imperative for the Powers to 
continue their policy of propping up the Empire as a way to 
maintain a European balance of power. Yet the massive loss of 
European territory at the end of the Balkan Wars made it 
abundantly clear Turkey was extremely vulnerable to its internal 
dissents.  
 To deal with the intensification of Turkish-Armenian tension 
brought on by the Balkan Wars, Russia spearheaded another 
proposed reform program. Months of negotiations resulted in a 
proposal recommending the establishment of a single Armenian 
vilayet (province) comprised of the six eastern provinces to be 
headed by a Christian governor. In addition, it called for an 
administrative council and provisional assembly to oversee the 
province and the dissolution of the Kurdish Hamidiye regiment. 
The agreement concluded in February 1914 had six European powers 
signatories to guarantee implementation of these reforms.65 The 
reform agreement was never put into action, but it did halt 
European military intervention early in 1914. Yet, other events 
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brought the European powers to war, with one consequence being 
the escalation of the Armenian question within the Ottoman Empire 
and international reaction to it.  
 
Genocide 
 
 The Armenians found themselves in a vulnerable position at 
the beginning of World War I. The Ottoman Empire entered the war 
on the side of the Central Powers, leaving the Armenians cut off 
from both Russia and Great Britain. In previous military disputes 
between Turkey and Russia, the eastern Armenian communities were 
considered suspects of suspicion as a result of their ties to 
Russia. The Great War was no exception. The Ottomans’ involvement 
in a much larger war than any previous conflicts with Russia came 
at a point when the Empire’s decline was intensifying and its 
future was at stake. Consequently the CUP began a preemptive 
strike against the Armenians in an effort to settle its 
historical problem of minority ethnicities at its borders. 
Beginning in the fall of 1914, the government began a number of 
tactics that provided a glimpse of its future plans for the 
Armenians. They included harsh tax collection, forced 
conscription, and confiscation of property in the Armenian 
regions, combined with forced disarmament, assaults, and 
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deportations of Armenian civilians in the extreme border 
regions.66  
 The events of the Armenian Genocide have been cited in 
countless survivor memoirs, eyewitness accounts, and diplomatic 
documents. However, the decision for the mass killing and 
deportations, combined with the presence of premeditated intent 
by the government, is hotly debated by historians. The 
destruction of CUP documents after the war and inaccessibility of 
modern Ottoman archives in addition to the extreme emotion 
surrounding the events and polarity among historians makes 
resolution of the debate most unlikely.  
 The course of the Genocide began in the spring of 1915 with 
a deportation order issued by the CUP for the removal of 
Armenians believed to be dangerous. Orders for the deportations 
were sent to local authorities in the regions, to be carried out 
by security forces. The deportation decree was typically 
announced to the village or city with the stated time for all 
Armenians to report for removal. Armenians were allowed to carry 
only a limited amount of personal belongings, forced to leave 
most items behind, many of which were plundered or sold to Muslim 
neighbors. Deportation orders were often accompanied by mass 
killings of Armenian civilians. Mass killings were primarily 
conducted by irregular Turkish gendarme units or armed Kurdish 
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and Circassian civilians. These atrocities were heaviest in the 
eastern and central regions of Anatolia and the areas of 
resettlement. Men were usually separated from the women, 
children, and old people, and massacre of the male population 
took place earlier than that of women.67  
 Turkish authorities blamed the need for deportations on the 
Armenian revolutionary movement, pointing to the outbreak of 
violence at the city of Van as proof of Armenian rebellion. 
Located near the Russian border, Van had a large Armenian 
population. In the spring of 1915 Russian military forces were 
advancing into Turkish territory, escalating tensions between 
Armenians and the Muslim Kurds and causing the outbreak of 
guerilla warfare. The Armenians claimed they were protecting 
themselves from pillage, while the Porte claimed the Armenians 
were trying to assist the Russians. Armenian civilians from the 
city and surrounding countryside fortified the city and held off 
Turkish military forces until the advance of the Russian army.68  
 At the same time tensions were inflaming in Van, the Porte 
implemented an organized persecution of Armenian notables and 
intelligentsia on April 24 in the capital. As part of an “early 
phase of genocide,” by September the government had taken 140 
Armenian prisoners in the capital and killed them without charges 
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or a trial. The victims were mostly men from the upper class who 
were well educated and included political leaders, newspaper 
reporters, artists, physicians, and clerics. Recent forensic 
scholarship argues that the targeting of high ranking members of 
society, termed cerebrogenocide, is a marker used to label 
ethnic-cleansing as a genocide. The Turkish goal was to deprive 
the Armenian community of leadership, as it is clear “that the 
victim’s potential leadership profile was of significance and 
indeed made them the preeminent targets for genocide.”69  
 At the end of May 1915, the Ottoman government issued orders 
to extend the geographic extent of the deportations further away 
from the border regions and to include the general Armenian 
population. Local Ottoman officials organized the deportations in 
coordination with regulations issued by the Porte. An end date 
for the deportations is hard to confirm, as deportations 
continued even after decrees to end them had been issued by the 
government. Local officials implementing the orders often ignored 
communications to end the deportations. Certainly, they had ended 
by early in 1917.70 
 The impact of the deportations was severe. People were given 
from a few days to a few hours notice to pack or sell their 
belongings. Most left all they had behind. As the male population 
                                                
 
69
 Alen Salerian, et al., “Review of Mass Homicides of Intelligentsia as 
a Marker for Genocide,” The Forensic Examiner 16, no. 3 (Fall 2007), 38.  
 
70
 Lewy, 151-154, 205-207,  
 46
was arrested or killed before being deported, the deportee 
population was mostly women and children. In some cases Armenians 
were forced to convert to Islam to escape death, although most 
were willing to covert to save their lives, and so the policy was 
abandoned by the Ottomans.71 Regions targeted for deportations 
were areas where Armenians constituted more than five to ten 
percent of the population, making the issue one of “Armenian 
population density.”72 Those Armenians surviving the initial 
massacres were made to walk to the areas of resettlement and 
faced any number of devastations including starvation, rape, 
kidnap, sickness, murder, and death along the way. Reports of the 
death toll for the deportations varied wildly and is not 
completely known. The farther the initial location was from the 
point of resettlement, the worse the experience.73  
 Initially, as the Porte issued decrees for deportation, they 
added provisions “to give the law a semblance of fair play.”74 The 
government promised the Armenians they would retain ownership of 
their original homes and land and even accrue rent money from 
Muslims living on the land during the term of the deportation. As 
part of the course of deportations, the Ottoman government also 
vowed protection for the Armenians from persecution or bodily 
harm. Furthermore it promised to provide assistance in rebuilding 
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Armenian communities and homes in the new areas and to protect 
the rights of property and life. The potential for the mitigation 
provisions to be effective was low as the government did little 
to enforce them, and Armenian deportees were rarely made aware of 
the existence of such provisions. In addition, the issues of 
deportation and mitigation often came after the actual 
deportations and massacres had begun.75  
 As a result, the Armenian quality of life during the 
deportations, and after, was dire. The resettlement camps for 
Armenians were located in the inner provinces of the Empire, far 
from the front lines. The geography of the area was arid and dry. 
Starvation was a critical problem, especially after Turkey began 
to experience resource shortages due to the war. The sanitary and 
health conditions were deplorable, and housing was sparse. In 
refuge camps in Rakka, epidemic diseases broke out, killing many 
of the Armenians who had survived the deportations. In Der-el-
Zor, the largest of the resettlement camps, the number of 
Armenian deportees exceeded the prescribed ten percent in 
relation to the Muslim population, resulting in thousands being 
expelled to suffer further misery in additional deportations.76 
 The total loss of life from the deportations, whether killed 
or died, and subsequent conditions is difficult to determine. 
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Ottoman census procedures during its last century were 
inconsistent, particularly with regards to urban versus rural 
areas. The government made a larger effort to determine accurate 
counts for male citizens than for females, as Muslim men in 
certain age groups were considered eligible for military 
conscription, and non-Muslim males were subject to the head tax. 
Still the population statistics for all citizens, including 
Armenians, both before and after the war are unreliable. The 
counts in the desert and mountain areas, regions with large 
Armenian populations, were little more than estimates, and 
figures for females were vastly underestimated.77  
 Not only are pre-war Ottoman population figures difficult to 
determine, but similarly is the exact cause of death for Armenian 
civilians. Deaths could have been caused by mass killings during 
the deportations, the horrific living conditions in refugee 
camps, military combat, or as a result of post-war military 
campaigns by Mustafa Kemal. As many as five to ten percent of 
Armenian women and children converted to Islam and were 
incorporated into Muslim households,78 while others relocated 
overseas after the war, further complicating the issue. Lastly, 
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as the debate among historians on the topic is exceptionally 
polemic, an author’s bias can influence the numbers.  
 Despite the difficulties, many research groups and 
historians have attempted to establish a number. In the most 
comprehensive study to date, Dr. Sarkis Karajian created a 
formula to calculate the Armenian deaths specifically related to 
the Genocide. He tallied population figures for the Armenian 
population in the Ottoman Empire and the Diaspora for both 1914 
and 1924 and the loss of Armenian life from 1918-1922 as result 
of combat or massacre. Karajian then subtracted the post-war 
population figures and the loss for life from 1918-1922 from the 
total pre-war population figure and concluded the total loss of 
Armenian life to exceed two million.79 Yet, as recently as 2002, 
studies by Turkish historians estimate the death toll at six 
hundred thousand80 one of the lowest estimates thus far.  
 While events and conditions surrounding the deportations are 
extensively documented, a fierce debate stills rages among 
historians. The heart of the controversy stems from the issue of 
premeditation, an element considered necessary to warrant use of 
the term genocide.81 Armenians believe the CUP held pre-wartime 
plans to annihilate them in an effort to cleanse Turkish society 
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of non-Turks. Historians cite Young Turk nationalism, available 
government documents, and diplomatic accounts from westerners to 
prove the Porte had intent to exterminate the Armenians prior to 
the outbreak of the war. The premeditated nature and ethnic 
motivation for the deportations have led these authors to label 
the event genocide.82 Vahakn Dadrian, the foremost historian 
supporting the premeditation thesis, argues “evidence clearly 
demonstrates that a pre-war provisional decision was already 
reached radically to solve the festering Armenian question at the 
first opportunity that may present itself.”83 Others supporting 
this argument include Richard Hovannisian, Taner Akçam, and most 
western and Armenian scholars. Conversely, Turkish historians 
maintain the Armenian communities in the border regions were 
engaged in treasonous activities and initiated a rebellion during 
the war to hinder the Turkish war effort. Thus, the Turkish 
government had no choice but to remove the Armenians from the 
region to protect the country and the subsequent loss of life was 
regrettable but not part of any ulterior motives.84 With the 
exception of Akçam, most Turkish historians take this 
perspective, and it remains the official policy of the modern 
Turkish government. Of course, some historians attempt to take a 
middling position, claiming the events can be labeled genocide 
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due to their catastrophic impact without the presence of 
premeditation.  
 Regardless of the presence of premeditation, the impact of 
the Genocide on the Armenian people can not be overstated. They 
were the community of people most affected by World War I, and 
the Genocide altered the course of their entire history. The 
infrastructure of the community was demolished, as displaced 
Armenians all over the empire lost their homes, property, and 
land, and many were left with no choice but emigration. It is 
clear “the trauma of the horrendous deaths of hundreds of 
thousands of people, compounded by the loss of the traditional 
homelands of more than three millennia, left deep, raw wounds on 
the Armenian psyche.”85  
 The Armenians withstood invasions and foreign control in 
their ancestral homeland for centuries before the Ottomans and 
always managed to rebuild and recover from any setback. Yet, a 
consequence of the Genocide was the trauma of the community that 
has continued into the twenty-first century.86 As Armenian 
generations have passed down stories of the Genocide, it has 
become engrained into the Armenian identity and consciousness. 
Donald and Lorna Miller’s study on Armenians in the modern 
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republic reveals that people characterize traumatic current 
events involving violent discrimination as recurrences of the 
Genocide.87 This aspect of the Genocide history, as part of the 
Armenian identity, is one of the reasons modern Turkey and 
Armenians struggle over reconciliation.  
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CHAPTER 3 
CONTENT ANALYSIS METHODOLOGY  
 
 
 Content analysis is a widely established method of research 
in social science fields. It is a method that uses systematic 
procedures to classify textual material in an effort to draw out 
meaning and relevance. Researchers analyze documents for themes 
or ideas and compare them for patterns. Content analysis began 
in the social sciences but “the impetus toward systematic 
analysis of documentary data is supported by increased interest 
in the analysis of textual writings in a diversity of 
fields...the humanities, for instance, have become increasingly 
involved in textual analysis in recent years and have developed 
their own methods and concerns.”88 Traditional content analysis 
methods focus on systemization and objectivity to give the study 
a scientific character in which the results can be reproduced by 
other researchers. Content analysis is appealing when studying 
mass communication because it can accommodate large amounts of 
text. Sampling procedures are often applied in content analysis 
studies that deal with mass quantities of data, combined with 
reliability tests to ensure accuracy. 
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 While the research methods of this study strive for 
accuracy and reliability, they do so based on a refined 
methodological procedure and academic integrity. The method of 
content analysis used in this thesis is designed to specifically 
suit the needs of historical inquiry. While historians do look 
for patterns and trends in content, they also focus on the 
context and framing of the content in an effort to examine the 
big picture. Historians attempt to place examination of textual 
content within its historical perspective, recognizing that 
historical writings do not exist in a vacuum but rather shape 
and are shaped by their contemporary backdrop.  
 For the purpose of conducting research on media coverage of 
the Armenian Genocide, the parameters of research were limited 
to make the resulting conclusions meaningful and relevant. 
American media coverage was chosen for several reasons. First, 
its content is in the English language, making it accessible to 
the researcher and to English speaking readers wishing to verify 
the conclusions. Second, American neutrality in the early years 
of the war provided a unique perspective and access to 
information through ongoing diplomatic relations with the 
Ottoman Empire. Finally, the purpose of the research is to 
develop a historical picture of American understanding and 
conception of the Armenian Genocide during the war. To 
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accomplish this, American media coverage was the evidence used 
for analysis.  
 The Washington Post was chosen as a large American newspaper 
located in the nation’s capital, a unique position from which the 
Post might both reflect on and influence the country’s leaders 
and public opinion. The Post was a daily paper by 1914, printing 
editions every day of the week, including an extended Sunday 
edition. 
 The period of study was limited to two years, from January 
1, 1915 to December 31, 1916, for a number of reasons. 
Historians date the Armenian Genocide to 1915. It is impossible 
to conclusively date the end to the Genocide, particularly as 
Turkey was not an occupied country at the end of the war and 
wartime leaders remained in power in the post-war government. 
The twenty-four month period selected allows for analysis of 
media coverage of the earliest events in the Genocide and 
continues long enough to include the variety of relevant topics 
in the news coverage and time for international reaction and 
response to be considered as well.  
 The unit for analysis in this study is the article. 
Articles were analyzed in their entirety and not broken down by 
word or sentence. The search for newspaper articles from the 
Washington Post was conducted using one source, the archives 
search engine on the Washington Post website. The words 
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“Armenia” and “Armenian” were used to identify relevant 
articles. All articles found were used in the research except 
those having no significance, specifically articles pertaining 
to the sinking of the ship Armenia.  
 There are two basic approaches to content analysis: 
qualitative and quantitative, and the “best content-analytic 
studies use both qualitative and quantitative operations on 
texts.”89 Consequently this study incorporates elements of both 
but relies primarily on qualitative analysis, with quantitative 
analysis being a supportive approach. Content analysis requires 
the use of defined categories to divide the units of analysis, 
in this case the article. Categorization is done based on set 
rules of procedure to ensure accuracy and reduce author bias and 
subjectivity.  
 This content analysis centers on three major issues. The 
first issue concerns the main topic displayed in articles on the 
Armenian Genocide. The five main topic categories were defined 
through an examination of all the articles for basic content. 
Five main topics were identified: description, international 
action, aid, subordinate reference, and location. Each category 
has a set definition that is broad and easily recognizable in 
the content of the text. The main topic of each article was 
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determined using the first two paragraphs of text combined with 
the headline for additional clarification. The main topic of the 
each article was used to categorize it into one of the five main 
topic categories. In the case of an article containing content 
relevant to more than one of the five defined primary 
categories, the rule of using the first two paragraphs to 
determine topic was applied. Additional themes in the content 
were addressed as a sub-topic, and method for sub-topic 
identification is discussed below.   
 The description category includes all articles in which the 
main topic is an account of massacres, killing, death tolls, 
refugee conditions, and/or deportations. These articles can 
include information on the locations of such events, the victims 
and perpetrators, the way in which Americans were affected by 
the massacres, and references to earlier persecutions.  
 A second category is international action. This category 
encompasses any articles covering international or domestic 
political reaction to the massacre of Armenians. It includes a 
variety of topics such as Allied responses, Turkish and German 
defense of the events, Armenian resistance and calls for 
assistance, international diplomacy in calling others to action, 
American political action in diplomacy with Turkey, and 
legislation for aid.  
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 The third category on aid includes all articles related to 
aid provided to the Armenians in forms other than military or 
political assistance. It includes aid sent by or received from 
all countries, although the news primarily concerns American 
relief and fundraising.  
 The fourth category, subordinate reference, includes all 
articles in which the main topic is not related to the Armenian 
Genocide or the Armenian people in general. Instead, references 
to the mass killing or suffering of Armenians are a sub-topic or 
side note used as a reference, example, or supporting evidence 
for the main topic. While the Armenian Genocide is not the main 
topic in these articles, they can still provide an interesting 
perspective on how the massacres were used or interpreted in 
other contexts and for what political purposes or to support 
which agendas. As a result, the articles’ main topics are widely 
varied in this category.  
 The final category is location. This category is notably 
smaller than others and contains articles in which the word 
Armenia or Armenian is used to name a location in Asia Minor or 
as an adjective to describe a geographical location. These 
articles are primarily about military engagements. The articles 
in this category were not discarded, as military movements often 
sparked massacres and so help clarify articles in other 
categories.  
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 The second major issue of the content analysis concerns the 
sub-topics or themes present within each category. The subthemes 
provide the substance of the analysis, as they examine the 
content for the context, source, and framework in which the 
Armenian Genocide was presented to Americans. This phase of the 
content analysis took place after the articles had been sorted 
into one of the five main topic categories, during which the 
articles within each category were then analyzed for internal 
themes. Within the main topic category, an article can have many 
subthemes and is not divided into only one category. Sub-topics 
are divisions of the story or supporting points within the story 
and can be noted when a change of idea or information occurs in 
the text. Within each main topic category, a series of questions 
were asked of all the articles to determine subthemes and 
facilitate analysis. The following questions were asked: 
• What reoccurring themes appear in multiple articles? 
• Are there any shared sources in multiple articles?  
• What kind of language is used to report the Genocide? 
  The third major issue addressed in the content analysis 
was the prominence of coverage the Post gave to the Armenian 
Genocide and was determined using a quantitative approach. The 
rational for measuring placement of stories is to determine 
visibility, and quantity of articles is for comparison between 
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main topic categories.  The following indicators are used to 
measure prominence: 
• total number of stories 
• number of stories beginning on page one 
• number of front page, headline articles  
• number of stories based on day of the week, month, and 
year 
• number of articles reported from foreign countries  
These indicators were applied to counts based on the total 
number of articles and the articles within each main topic 
category. The results of this analysis are displayed in the text 
of the analysis and also represented in table form. Results from 
the quantitative analysis provide information on which category 
received the most coverage, when the media coverage in a 
particular category was the highest, and how any trends arise 
from the dates and days of media coverage. Measurement 
concerning the country of origin for news sources also reveals 
any reliance on a country or side in the war for information.   
 Other methods of measuring prominence commonly employed in 
content analysis were considered but discarded as impractical 
for this study. One such method was the use of word count. Word 
count can be used to as an indicator of prominence, with the 
length of an article indicative of its important. The topics of 
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longer articles receive more coverage, and so play a larger role 
in shaping public opinion. While this point is valid, the use of 
word count as a tool for this study was deemed unfeasible due to 
discrepancies between the Washington Post’s report of word count 
for articles as compared to researcher verification in the text.  
 The following are the results of the content analysis 
study.  
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CHAPTER 4 
RESEARCH RESULTS  
 
Qualitative Analysis 
 
Description 
 This category includes articles in which the main topic is 
a description of the mass killings and deportations Armenians. 
This category is placed first because knowledge and details of 
the massacres themselves are crucial as a basis for 
understanding all further action regarding the Armenians. For 
Americans, the way media coverage portrayed the events, the 
vocabulary used, amount of detail provided, and placement of 
blame created the foundation for immediate and future opinion, 
emotion about the massacres and opinion of Turkey.  
 The description category contains a total of forty-nine 
articles, out of one hundred eighty total, thirty-seven in 1915 
and twelve in 1916. The very first article in January 1915 falls 
under this category and the bulk of the articles in this 
category were printed between April 1915 and February 1916. The 
largest number of descriptive articles appeared in August 1915, 
with a total of eight, in a month of fifteen total articles. Of 
all five categories, the description group is the first theme to 
arise in the media coverage, and is heaviest in the mid and late 
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months of 1915, tapering off by mid 1916. Nine of the forty-nine 
articles appear on the front page and three appear as headline 
stories. (Refer to Table 2 and Table 6).  
 Before beginning an analysis of the many different sub-
topic themes contained in the description category, it is first 
necessary to address the core content, the actual descriptions. 
Media coverage with descriptions of the massacre of Armenians 
and conditions of refuges was some of the most graphic of all 
the articles surveyed and understandably provoked emotion and 
instigated much of the coverage to follow in other categories. 
First hand stories and accounts of the killing, pillaging, and 
treatment of Armenians in Turkey during World War I is perhaps 
the least controversial aspect of the Genocide, as it is so well 
documented and collaborated. Articles in the Washington Post are 
comparable in content to eyewitness accounts from other sources 
on the events.  
 Article titles in this category provided the first glimpse 
of the content to follow. Headlines such as “50 Tied and 
Drowned”, “Greatest Horrors in History,” and “Starving 
Armenians,” gave readers a glimpse of the content of the article 
and made it clear the topic of the article was coverage of the 
massacres. Provoking headlines might as also have been a ploy to 
drawn readers in and gain a shock factor. Descriptive articles 
reported on the massacre of Armenians “who were led out into the 
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street, where they were either shot or their throats cut”90 or 
gave vivid descriptions of death such as, “the plain of 
Alashgerd is virtually covered with the bodies of men, women and 
children.”91 Other examples included accounts of “throwing the 
bodies of the victims into the Tigris and Euphrates rivers,”92 
“corpses of noncombatants, both men and women, strewn along 
every trail,”93 and wells “in which the bodies of the dead had 
been crammed.”94 They used phrases like “general”, “systematic”, 
“organized”, 95 “annihilation”, and “extermination”96 to describe 
the massacre of Armenians.   
 While descriptive quotes about the massacres are endless, 
simple descriptions have limits. Stand alone descriptions about 
the massacres can not reveal the motivations of the author, 
assign responsibility for the massacres, determine causes and 
effect of the events, or the source of the information. 
Descriptions are much more relevant when read and understood 
within the context of the article. Key themes to identify in 
                                                
 
90
 “Turks Cut 150 Armenians’ Throats; Force Fifty to Jump Into an 
Abyss,” Washington Post, February 28, 1915, R3. 
 
91
 “Hundreds of Men, Women and Children are Slain by Kurds in Armenian 
Plain,” Washington Post, March, 20, 1915, 3.   
 
92
 “100,000 Armenians Sent into Exile; Massacre Victims Put at 10,000,” 
Washington Post, August 11, 1915, 3.   
 
93
 “Armenia Land of Ruin,” Washington Post, August 22, 1915, R1.   
 
94
 “Died in Fleeing Kurds,” Washington Post, April, 26, 1915, 3.  
 
95
 “Fear Kurd Massacre,” Washington Post, April, 18, 1915, 3; “Turks Cut 
150 Armenians’ Throats; Force Fifty to Jump Into an Abyss,” Washington Post, 
February 28, 1915, R3; “Turks Hard Pressed in Armenia; Bitlis Massacre 
Presages Retreat,” Washington Post, July 13, 1915, 2.  
 
96
  “Russians Pursue Turk,” Washington Post, May 6, 1915, 3; “Turks Kill 
Thousands,” Washington Post, August 6, 1915, 2.   
 65
articles with descriptions are the kind of vocabulary used, 
other information provided in proximity to the descriptions, and 
if the article provided coverage on reactions to the massacres.  
 Articles in the description category are unique from those 
in other categories in that they often included a source for 
their information such as an eyewitness. Identification of a 
source for the information made the news more reliable or 
creditable. In some cases the article referred to a 
correspondent reporting the news97 with little other information, 
making the nationality or reliability difficult to determine. 
The most common type of source used was an eyewitness, in most 
cases a refugee. In “Turks Kill Christians” and “Moslems Slay 
People in Ten Villages” unnamed refugees in Persia and Russia 
reported the massacre of Armenians and looting of towns around 
Lake Van.98 In instances where the refugee’s name is known, it 
was reported, as in the case of Dr. Kochadur Bonaparian, an 
Armenian refugee in Russia who reported the spread of disease 
and the fate of American missionaries in Armenia.99 As refugees 
were the victims of the offenses, they could have potential bias 
in reporting the events. They could exaggerate the crimes or 
death toll to embarrass Turkey or compel assistance from Russia 
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and other Allied countries. Also the refugees primarily fled to 
Russia or Persia, two locations under Allied control. News 
coming out of Allied countries could have been biased based on 
wartime alliances and ulterior motives on the part of the Allies 
to portray Turkey as evil in an effort to draw the United States 
into the war on their side.  
 American missionaries were also the source of large amounts 
of eyewitness coverage. The area of Lake Van was the location of 
conflict between the Russian and Turkish armies, and a siege was 
fought for the city when Armenian guerilla forces fortified the 
city to wait for the arrival of the Russians. The city housed an 
American mission and school, so missionaries witnessed fighting 
and persecutions in the area. Missionaries were a source of 
information on the events and considered reliable sources of 
information, as they were American and so not likely to be 
clouded by national bias. In October 1915 sixteen missionaries 
arrived in the United States after serving in Turkey. An article 
recounted how they sheltered Armenians from Turks and Kurds and 
the terrible conditions in Armenia.100 In another instance an 
anonymous female missionary who escaped to Cairo submitted a 
report describing the situation in Turkey. She recounted the 
conditions of deported Armenians on their way to Syria, the 
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enslavement of women for Turkish harems, her own attempts to 
covertly provide aid for refugees, and imprisonment of other 
missionaries.101  
 Missionaries not only provided information for reports but 
also gave public speeches. A story in October 1915 covered a 
speech by returned missionary Dr. Henry Barnum, who spoke at a 
church service of the killing of Christians by Muslims. He 
advocated continued support of the foreign missions board’s work 
in Turkey.102 American missionaries were considered reliable 
sources as they had worked in Turkey for decades. They knew the 
people and the country, had established contacts and were 
considered authorities on the subject. In addition, missionaries 
provided the opportunity for American sources of information, 
that were not filtered through international outlets and 
correspondents.  
 Eyewitness accounts were not only filtered through 
international media outlets but also by international and 
domestic committees and organizations. The American Committee 
for Armenian and Syrian Relief, the Armenian Red Cross Fund in 
London, and the Armenian General Progressive Association in the 
United States disseminated information they received in reports. 
Relief organizations prepared press releases and made statements 
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to inform the public about the events and conditions in Armenia.  
In some cases, the articles told how the organization received 
its information, such as an eyewitness or religious spokesperson 
as was the case with the Katholikos, head of the Armenian 
Church.103  
 Reliability of sources and the information they provided 
was clearly an issue, as some reports attempted to demonstrate 
the validity of their information. In an article on an account 
of the atrocities in Armenia complied by an American committee 
with interests in Turkey, the committee began the report by 
emphasizing the integrity and authority of the writers and the 
large amounts of information gathered from informed sources on 
the topic.104 In another case, the American Committee on Armenian 
and Syrian Relief prefaced its publicized report by stating 
information came through a “high diplomatic authority in Turkey, 
not American, reporting the testimony of trustworthy witnesses 
over wide areas.”105  
 Now that different types of sources and source biases have 
been discussed, the various sub-topic themes presented within 
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this category will be discussed. There are six sub-topic themes 
in the description category: the correlation between military 
engagement and Armenian massacres, perpetrators of the 
persecutions, the use of religious terminology, references to 
pre-war massacres, the presence of Americans in Armenia, and 
retaliatory action by Armenians.  
 The first theme is the correlation between Turkish and 
Russian military engagements and the massacre of Armenians. 
Several articles specifically state the two events were related, 
of that one premeditated the other. In one of the earliest 
articles printed in 1915, a special cable reported murders of 
Armenians in Tiflis escalated after news of Russian occupation 
of Ardahan. The initial death toll of fifteen rose to one 
hundred fifty in a “systematic massacre” in retaliation after 
the news of Russian military success.106 Two later stories made 
reference to massacres and pillaging of villages that occurred 
prior to the evacuation of Turks in anticipation of the arrival 
of Russian forces.107 A final article told of Russian military 
successes in Caucasus and the spread of Turkish destruction of 
Armenian homes in the area.108 While Russian military success in 
Armenia was by no means the source of tension between Armenians 
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and Muslims, the articles show that at times military movements 
served as a catalyst to provoke or increase the severity of 
persecutions.  
 The second sub-topic theme concerns the perpetrators of the 
persecutions. Most of the articles that name perpetrators in the 
massacres cite Turks, Kurds, or both. If not clearly stated, it 
is unclear whether the term “Turk” refers to Turkish troops, 
gendarmes, or members of the civilian population. Some articles 
provided exact information, such as one in April 1915 that 
reported Turkish troops with the help of local Turkish police 
massacred Armenians and killed any who escaped the first 
round.109 An article only a few weeks later reported Armenians 
attempts to defend themselves against the Kurds, but “the Kurds 
were aided by Turkish regulars.”110 A similar story said “Turks 
distributed 40,000 rifles among Kurds in Mush Valley for use 
against Armenians.”111  
 Vague references to Turkish perpetrators without 
identification of military status created a conception of the 
“Turk” as a homogenous entity, wholly capable of violent 
discrimination. Articles that reported persecution by Turkish 
regular troops and police or the distribution of weapons with 
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the intent of killing Armenians implies organization, 
preplanning, and orders from a higher authority.  
 Some articles actually cited orders for the massacres or 
directly blamed the Turkish government. An article in March 1915 
said in the cities of Salmaz, Pagaduk, and Sarna the Turkish 
commissioner gave orders for the “destruction of the towns.”112 
Two other stories blamed the government directly, saying it 
ordered the deportation of the Armenians and used it as cover to 
commit rape, murder, and pillage. One in particular directly 
stated the persecutions were “not in response to fanatical or 
popular demand, but is purely arbitrary, and directed from 
Constantinople.”113  
 One of the major controversies in the historiography of the 
Armenian Genocide is the role of the Committee of Union and 
Progress as the invisible hand instigating the massacres. Some 
historians argue the CUP secretly ordered wide scale mass 
killing of Armenians, while other historians argue massacres 
spontaneously ignited as a result of inter-communal rivalry. In 
these cases there is also controversy concerning who carried out 
the massacres, civilian Kurds or Turkish troops, the latter of 
which would imply orders from the government. While Washington 
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Post news articles can not necessarily be considered reliable 
sources for solving this controversy, contemporary coverage on 
the identity of the perpetrators can clarify how Americans 
understood the events and any deep rooted stereotypes created 
based on the media coverage.  
 Another significant sub-topic theme present in articles in 
this category is the use of religious vocabulary to describe the 
events. While the terms “Christian” and “Muslim” were commonly 
used interchangeably with “Armenian” and “Turk,” other types of 
religious terminology were employed to provide context to the 
reader and associate Armenian with good and Turk with bad. Two 
articles both created similar parallels between the Jews’ escape 
from Egypt in the Bible and Armenian refugees’ flight from 
Turkey. Armenian and Nestorian Christian refugees’ journey to 
Persia was called an “exodus” in an article in April 1915 and in 
another, a narrative about an American missionary labeled him a 
“modern day Moses” who “shepherded his enormous flock out of the 
Armenian province of Van.”114 In another report, a pastor was 
equated to a “savior” and credited with leading “his” Armenians 
to the safety of Russia’s western civilization, just barely 
escaping the advancing Turks.115 
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 In an story covering a speech by a retuned American 
missionary at the Ingram Memorial Church service in October 
1915, the speaker, Dr. Branum, cloaked his account of the 
massacre of Armenians in strong religious language. He claimed 
Turks killed Armenians because they were Christian and refused 
to convert to Islam. He stated the Turks felt it was their 
mission to rid the world of unbelievers.116  
 The religious language used in descriptions of the 
massacres was not extensive, but it is worth noting as a context 
through which American readers learned and understood the 
Armenian Genocide. Referring to refugees’ journey as an exodus 
correlates it to the Jewish journey leaving Egypt and connects 
the Armenians symbolically to God’s chosen people, making them 
worthy of protection. It also drew a correlation between the 
Turks and the Egyptians as the enslavers and the villains. With 
this language, the centuries old, complex relationship between 
the Turks and Armenians was simplified into clearly 
distinguishable roles. The theme of an American serving as Moses 
to lead the Armenians to safety is similarly telling. It placed 
America in the role of savior to the Armenians and assigned it 
the responsibility to free the Armenians from Turkey. It 
provides perspective for how Americans may have viewed their 
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relationship and duty to the Armenians and their role as a 
player in the larger global conflict.  
 A handful of articles mentioned previous persecutions of 
Armenians in Turkey, primarily the 1894-1896 massacres under 
Sultan Abdul Hamid II. A story early in 1915 referred to the 
1894-1896 massacres and expressed fear that the current events 
might become a repeat of the previous century. It claimed the 
“Young Turks have adopted the policy pursued by Abdul Hamid that 
year, namely the annihilation of the Armenians.”117 Articles from 
British news sources, quoting letters from a diplomatic 
representative of the Armenian Katholikos, said that the modern 
massacres far surpassed any occurring under Abdul Hamid II.118  
 Articles that refer to earlier massacres provide several 
perspectives. First they take the Genocide out of the context of 
the global war and put it into the context of the historical 
tension between Turks and Armenians. In doing so, it showed 
continuity in the animosity that stemmed from deep rooted 
conflicts. It also portrayed the Turks as inherently evil and as 
not merely retaliating against a situation created by the 
contemporary conflict. Comparisons to prior massacres also 
provided a reference point to gage the severity of the current 
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persecutions and to emphasize the great need for intervention 
and aid.  
 By far the largest sub-topic theme in this category is the 
presence and safety of Americans in Armenia. As already noted, 
American missionaries in Armenia provided many eyewitness 
accounts of the Armenian massacres. In addition to articles 
attributing information to American sources, much of the news 
coverage focused on the safety of Americans working in Turkey 
and their ability to safely escape. Coverage in mid-1915 
reported Americans in Armenia were safe and did not fear 
persecution as they were “regarded as neutral and not likely to 
be attacked.”119 Yet, as the Russian army moved further into 
Armenia toward the city of Van, where a large American mission 
was located, reports appeared of threats to American safety. 
Just days after the first story, the Washington Post reported 
American missionaries in Van were “in grave danger”120 as Turk and 
Kurdish forces besieged the city. In other cities, the news 
reported Americans had to flee and abandon their missions.121 
Fear for the safety of Americans became a diplomatic issue, as a 
story two days later reported that the Grand Vizier of Turkey 
issued an order to the governor of Van in the presence of 
Ambassador Morgenthau to protect Americans in the city and 
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American interests throughout Turkey.122 In August 1915, two 
articles reported that the American missionaries in Van had 
escaped the country and reached safety with the exception of one 
who died.123  
 Other articles concerning Americans in Turkey referred to 
an American who provided aid to persecuted Armenians. In one 
instance, Americans attempted to hide Armenian children by 
concealing them in schools, only to have them taken away and 
given to Muslim families.124 Others tell of American missionaries 
in Van who sheltered Armenian women and children during the 
attack on the city or missionaries at Urumiah who were forced to 
pay “$40,000 as a ransom for refugees who had fled to the 
mission for protection.”125  
 Two articles concerning the safely of Americans appear on 
the front page, each in a headline story, emphasizing the 
importance of the topic. In an article on April 29, 1915, the 
headline reads “Crucified by Turks.” Missionaries reported the 
killing of native Christians in Persia, some by crucifixion. A 
lesser headline in the article read “Turks Attack Americans” and 
reported Turks attacked an American and French Roman Catholic 
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Mission in Urumiah and took five Russian priests hostage.126 The 
second headline article reported the death of a U.S citizen in 
Urfa. Few details were given, only that the American died by 
poisoning and had been working to disperse funds allocated for 
refugees.127 The prominent placement of articles concerning 
Americans emphasized the importance of the issue and a focus on 
Americans as a source of protection to refugees. It also further 
enforced the image of the evil Turk, who attacked Americans, 
making him a natural enemy of America. With America portrayed as 
an enemy of Turkey, it conversely implied she was natural ally 
of the Entente nations.  
 While the vast majority of the articles in this category 
describe persecutions against the Armenians, three describe 
retaliatory actions on the part of Armenians against Kurds and 
Turks, the final sub-topic theme. In October 1915 and again in 
February 1916, two stories told of Armenians looting Turkish 
homes and killing fleeing troops. After the Turkish retreat in 
Van, Armenians in hiding came out to “duplicate the atrocities 
that had previously been practiced upon Armenians.”128 Similarly, 
when Turkish forces fled from Erzerum in advance of Russian 
troops, Armenians massacred Turkish troops and began helping the 
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approaching Russians129. In both articles, the headlines directly 
reflected the main topic of the Armenian actions, and each 
article qualified the information to say the Armenian action was 
retaliatory against similar actions committed against them. 
While these articles are few, they are noteworthy as they show 
Americans had knowledge of atrocities committed by Armenians, 
and that the persecutions were not only the one-sided slaughter 
of a single ethnic group.   
 Similar acts of retaliation were described in a unique 
article detailing an official report issued by the Ottoman 
government in October 1915. In the report, the Ottoman 
government claimed many atrocities were committed against Turks 
by Greeks and Armenians who cooperated with Russian forces. The 
article recounted ten examples of such atrocities and 
specifically said it omitted some of the graphic details. The 
report contained details of rape, suicide, battery, murder, 
massacre, and dismemberment crimes committed against Turks.130 It 
is clear from this article, and the official Turkish report, 
that Turkey made an effort to justify its persecution of the 
Armenians and claimed the sovereign right to defend its citizens 
against similar acts.  
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 The description category is crucial to understand the types 
of vivid details Americans read about the massacre of Armenians. 
Any type of public outcry, international diplomacy, or relief 
efforts were a response to the severity of Armenian suffering, 
which was communicated to the American people in part by the 
media. Graphic accounts of murder, starvation, and pillage made 
Americans aware of the plight of Armenian refugees. Religious 
vocabulary defined the symbolic relationship of the Turks and 
the Armenians and portrayed America as a savior of the Armenian 
people. The Muslim Turks and Kurds were continuously named as 
the perpetrators of violent persecution, and all stories on 
Armenian retaliation qualified it as justifiable self-defense. 
Discussion of Armenian massacres from the previous century 
served to weaken Turkish claims of deportations for national 
security by demonstrating a historical hatred of the Armenians. 
The most prominent theme of the safely and importance of 
Americans in Turkey illustrated American concern over the fate 
of its own citizens at the hands of the Turks and associated 
Turkey as an enemy to the United States.  
 
International Action 
 The international action category is comprised of articles 
covering reaction or dialogue from around the world concerning 
the Armenian persecutions. It is the most widely varied 
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category, with many subthemes. They range from United States and 
international political action, accusations of blame, and 
appeals for aid. Overall, the articles in this category tend to 
be longer than those in other categories and more often contain 
excerpts of articles from international newspapers. There are 
four sub-topic themes: United State diplomacy, international 
appeals to the United States, Turkish diplomacy concerning the 
Armenians, and German political action concerning the Armenians.  
 This category contains fifty-six articles, more than any 
other category. Thirty of the articles were printed in 1915 and 
twenty in 1916. They are concentrated in the fall and winter 
months of 1915 and very early in 1916. They then taper off until 
a slight resurgence in the summer of 1916. The articles in this 
category are reactionary to the descriptive coverage of the 
massacres, and so they peak drastically just two months after 
the concentration of articles in the description category. The 
month with the highest number of articles is October 1915, when 
twelve were printed. The international action category has five 
front page articles and one headline story. (Refer to Table 2 
and Table 6).  
 The first and largest theme in this category is on the 
topic of United States diplomacy. Starting in April 1915, the 
Post began reporting on American communication with Turkey 
regarding the massacres. Articles reported the United States 
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sent appeals to Turkey through Ambassador Henry Morgenthau to 
protect Armenians and prevent “religious outbreaks.”131 Articles 
reporting similar appeals continued in May, September, and 
October 1915 and on into February 1916. The stories reveal a 
continuity in the United States approach to diplomacy with 
Turkey. Similar to the first appeal sent in April, news reports 
said Morgenthau was directed to “take the matter up,” “inquire 
into reported outrages,” “inform the Turkish minister of foreign 
affairs” as to negative American sentiment, and “present a 
protest, which is in effect a warning” to the Ottoman government 
of United States displeasure.132 As late as July 1916, over a 
year after the first information on United States diplomatic 
communication with Turkey, an article reported that the news of 
more severe atrocities against Armenians had “led the State 
Department to consider making new representations to the 
Porte.”133  
 Not only do these articles reveal the lukewarm tone of 
American policy, some articles mention that American 
representations to the Porte did not “threaten a break in 
diplomatic relations”, but rather “unless the massacres ceased 
friendly relations between the American people and the people of 
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Turkey would be threatened.”134 Additional articles reaffirmed 
this policy and further reported that “the United States could 
not take official action in a mater involving the treatment by a 
government of its own nationals, and could only take cognizance 
of the situation on the grounds of justice and humanity.”135 It 
was not until December 1916 that an article reveals a shift in 
American policy. Entitled “U.S. Turns on Turkey,” it said the 
State Department would delay in confirming the new Turkish 
ambassador until the United States received a reply from Turkey 
on past representations.136  
 While the Post is not persuasive as a legitimate source on 
American foreign policy toward Turkey in these years, it is 
useful as an indicator of the type of information presented to 
Americans on U.S. policy regarding the Armenian Genocide. It can 
also provide evidence as to American’s reaction to the policy 
and news on the massacres. In May 1915, an article reporting on 
American diplomacy noted the State Department had received “a 
flood of communications from various parts of the country,” 
pushing for the government to help Armenians in Turkey.137 
Additional articles named American public sentiment as the 
motivation for representations to the Ottoman government and 
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stated the “American people have been deeply stirred by the fate 
of the Christians ruthlessly slaughtered in Armenia.”138 
References to American public opinion calling for action reveals 
a reaction to the news of the massacres provided in articles 
containing descriptions. They also reveal a motive on the part 
of the United States government to use that public opinion to 
threaten Turkey with possible deterioration of relations. At a 
time when the United States was still a neutral country, 
strained relations could escalate if the United States entered 
the war on the side of the Allies.  
  A second trend in the articles in this category is 
international appeals to the United States to help the Armenians 
or convey messages between nations. America’s status as a 
neutral country made it especially attractive as an intermediary 
between the Allied and the Central Powers. It also gave the 
United States more access to information concerning the 
Armenians, which she could in turn share with the Allied 
countries. The first article covering American communication to 
the Porte over the Armenian persecutions cited a request from 
the Russian government as the impetus for America taking action. 
Severed relations between Russia and Turkey prevented 
negotiations between the two, so Russia turned to the United 
                                                
 
138
 “U.S. to Aid Armenians,” Washington Post, October 5, 1915, 1; “Wilson 
Warns Turks,” Washington Post, October 6, 1915, 2; U.S Warns the Sultan,” 
Washington Post, February 19, 1916, 2.  
 84
States. Included in the Russian request was a message from the 
head of the Armenian Catholic church to President Wilson asking 
for aid.139  
 The majority of appeals for aid from the United States came 
from Great Britain. Viscount Bryce, former ambassador to the 
United States, was a vocal proponent of United States action. 
Three articles in September 1915, January and February 1916 
reported on Bryce’s appeals for US action. He called on the 
neutral nations, “especially America,” to use their influence on 
Turkey to stop the horrors and persuade Germany to reprimand the 
Porte.140 Later articles report he directly asked the United 
States government to send relief to the Armenians.141  
 Further appeals came in stories quoting British sources: 
the chairman of the British Armenia committee and the minister 
of At. Augustine’s Edgbaston. Two additional stories were 
reprinted from British newspapers. In one, America was named the 
“important neutral,” and all the stories reiterated the claim 
that American pressure on Germany could stop the massacres.142 
Similar to the articles on Viscount Bryce, they contained 
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descriptive information on the massacres in an effort to connect 
the reality of the horror directly to appeals for action.   
 Another trend within the international action category is 
Ottoman diplomacy involving the massacre of Armenians. Beginning 
in August 1915, a series of articles presented random and 
inconsistent information about Turkish politics on the Armenian 
issue. The first such article hinted at conflict in the Turkish 
cabinet over the issue of the Armenian Genocide. It reported, 
the “grand vizier, according to one correspondent, had 
threatened to resign unless the reported treatment of Greeks and 
Armenians ceases.”143 Two months later, an article reported that 
Turkey made clear to the United States government that “she will 
not permit interference by any foreign power of her so-called 
‘Armenian policy’”.144 Then only five days later, the Washington 
Post printed news out of Constantinople that the Porte had 
thrown an “impenetrable veil over its action toward all 
Armenians,” in light of public disapproval on the Armenian 
policy from the Turkish upper classes who “favor a policy of 
conciliation, and some of who even go as far as to advocate the 
establishment of a separate Armenian state”.145 Contradictory 
information about the political mood in Turkey attested to the 
limited and unreliable sources but also to the volatile mood in 
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the country as the Porte faced an advancing Russian army and 
fluctuating public opinion on the Armenian persecutions.  
 Also in October 1915, articles on Turkish political action 
began to shift toward a theme of Turkish justification of their 
actions, calling them reactionary to Armenian rebellion. An 
article announcing the appointment of Halil Bey to the Ottoman 
cabinet contained an interview in which he claimed the Armenians 
were “traitors” who conspired with the Russian army in the 
attack on Van.146 Continuing with this theme, two articles out of 
Berlin in February 1916 reported on the publication of a Turkish 
White Book on the mass killing of Armenians. The book identified 
a historical conflict between the Ottoman government and the 
Armenians in which the latter continuously sought international 
protection from Russia and Great Britain. At the outbreak of the 
war, the “Armenians shrank from no sacrifice in furtherance of 
the entente’s military operations.”147  
 The final sub-topic theme is German political action 
concerning the Armenians. There are nine articles that contain 
this theme, all of which were published in a five month period 
from September 1915 to January 1916. They fall into two almost 
equal sections: articles in which the Germans defend Turkish 
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actions against the Armenians, and articles in which Germany 
protests the massacres.  
 The articles in which Germany supports the Turkish 
persecutions of Armenians claimed that the Armenians were 
seditious and gave assistance to the Russians. In “Uphold 
Turkish Acts,” the article reported that Turkish actions to deal 
with the Armenian uprisings were “an internal affair which 
concerns him alone.”148 Similarly, an article in the same month, 
containing excerpts from a German newspapers, said the 
“oppressive measures the Ottoman government found itself 
compelled to adopt against it Armenians subjects” were a “war 
measure,” and that the British press was exaggerating the state 
of conditions in Armenia.149 German sources also used a tactic of 
identifying atrocities committed by the Allies in India, 
Ireland, Poland, and the Boer War to combat Allied condemnation 
of the mass killing of Armenians.150 In the most extreme defense 
of Turkey, one article quoted a letter publicized by the German 
ambassador in which he called the alleged atrocities “pure 
invention,” and said the reports from the Armenian catholicos 
were only written under pressure from Russia.151  
                                                
 
148
 “Upholds Turkish Acts,” Washington Post, October 10, 1915, 14.  
 
149
 “German View of the War: British Stories of Armenian Outrages are 
Held Unreliable,” Washington Post, October 25, 1915, 4.     
 
150
 “British Accused of Atrocities in Reply to Armenian Charges,” 
Washington Post, October 30, 1915, 2.  
 151 “Envoy Defends Turks,” Washington Post, October 28, 1915, 3.  
 88
 In an opposite approach, some articles reported on German 
attempts to halt the Turkish persecution of Armenians. Three 
articles ranging from October 1915 to December 1915 all made 
almost identical reports. They claimed the German ambassador in 
Turkey submitted a protest on behalf of the German government on 
the subject of Armenian massacres to the Turkish foreign office. 
The articled cited both Ambassador Morgenthau and James Barton 
of the American Committee on Armenian and Syrian Relief as 
corroborating sources that confirm the existence of such a 
protest.152 In a comparable story, a German diplomat representing 
the German Emperor publicized a statement, stating Germany holds 
the protection of Christians in Turkey as a high priority and 
would take measure to uphold its responsibility.153  
 One lone article presented a vague view of the German 
diplomatic position. It contained an excerpt of the reply from a 
political leader in the German foreign office on the topic of 
the Armenians. It said the Turkish government was compelled to 
action by seditious intrigues on the part of the Armenians. It 
further stated the Turkish and Germans governments were 
participating in an “interchange of ideas” on the subject, yet 
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the story was unclear as to the type of position Germany had on 
the massacres.154  
 
Aid 
 The category on aid includes all articles that report on 
pleas for aid to the Armenians from any source, civilian efforts 
to raise money or supplies, and domestic political action to 
support civilian relief efforts. There are five identified sub-
topics in this category: pleas for aid, domestic political 
action, the role of private organizations, international 
diplomacy, and civilian relief efforts. All of the sub-topics 
are present in more than four articles.  
 The aid category includes twenty-nine articles total, seven 
in 1915 and twenty-two in 1916. The bulk of articles on aid were 
published in the fall of 1916, with thirteen in October 1916. 
Aid articles are heaviest toward the end of the twenty-four 
month period examined, coming after articles describing the 
massacres and international actions. The aid category has two 
front page articles, the same as the location category, and the 
fewest. Of the two front page stories, one is a headline 
article. (Refer to Table 2 and Table 6).  
 The first sub-topic theme concerns pleas for aid. The first 
articles containing pleas for aid to the Armenians came in June 
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1915. They stories reported dire circumstances in Van, due to 
limited medical supplies and personnel and told of Armenians 
hiding in American buildings. In both, American missionaries in 
Van begged for urgent assistance.155 Further articles with pleas 
for aid came in the fall of 1915, the first from Lord Bryce of 
Great Britain. Bryce communicated with a private relief 
organization urging American humanity to respond with 
assistance.156 A second report in October contained a letter to 
the newspaper from the wife of an Armenian. In it, she lamented 
the woeful situation of the Armenians and urged America to do 
its duty to the Armenians.157  
 A second sub-topic theme is domestic political action on 
relief efforts. While articles covering international action and 
diplomacy were discussed in the last main topic category, this 
sub-topic theme deals only with political action directly 
related to relief efforts. The first instance came through 
multiple reports of attempts by Ambassador Morgenthau to provide 
relief for Armenians and negotiations to bring Armenian refugees 
to the Untied States. Two articles in September and October 1915 
reported that Morgenthau offered the Turkish government money to 
transport Armenians to America, where they “would make good 
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citizens to settle the less thickly populated parts of the 
Western States.”158 The articles reported Morgenthau offered one 
million dollars of his own money and promised to raise four 
million dollars more as part of the plan and that the Turkish 
government accepted the offer.159  
 Early articles in this category show that the United States 
government took a hands-off approach to orchestrating Armenian 
relief efforts. A September 1915 story reported that all efforts 
to raise relief for Armenians will be on the part of private 
organization without United States government assistance, as the 
Turkish government had threatened against interference. Private 
organizations were preparing to launch a nation-wide appeal for 
relief with information provided my Morgenthau on the 
massacres.160  
 Still later articles reveal a slight shift in the 
government’s policy. Private relief organizations encountered 
difficulties in transporting supplies to Turkey and turned to 
the government for assistance. Reports beginning only a month 
later told of collaboration with the United States Navy in 
sending material supplies and possible transportation of 
refugees back to America. Almost a full year later, in October 
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1916, similar articles described further attempts for 
collaboration between the United States Navy and private relief 
organizations. The first article reported the Navy denied a 
request for a battleship to transport supplies to Armenia, but 
two weeks later an article informed that the Navy approved space 
on a collier for supplies.161 While the United States government 
did not participate in the collection or distribution of 
supplies, the articles show cooperation on the part of the 
government in the relief effort.  
 Two more articles in 1916 show a much more direct political 
action. The first in February covered a political partisan clash 
between two United Sate Senators during discussions over a 
resolution. Senator Lodge proposed a resolution requesting 
President Wilson name a day for public relief collections to aid 
Armenians.162 An article the following September reported the 
success of the resolution, saying it passed Congress and 
consequently President Wilson issued two proclamations. They 
appointed specific relief days for private contributions to aid 
Armenians and Lithuanians to be collected by private relief 
organizations.163  
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 This sub-topic is small, due to the limited amount of 
government action regarding aid for the Armenians. While United 
States political action for the Armenians on a diplomatic level 
is discussed in a different category, this sub-topic shows the 
United States government did very little to contribute to relief 
effort for Armenians; one article even reported the State 
Department would respect Turkey’s policy of non-interference. 
The only real sign of government participation was through the 
Navy Department’s transportations of supplies, and that only 
occurred after massive efforts on the part of private 
organizations.  
 A third sub-topic theme in this category concerns the role 
of private organizations in the relief effort. It is a large 
theme reflecting the prominent position they played in raising 
money, supplies, and interest for the Armenians. None of the 
articles in this sub-topic theme reported on the committees 
themselves, but rather the committees are referenced for their 
role in the raising funds and organizing collections. All of the 
articles reflect the prominent role private organizations played 
in raising money and coordinating the logistics of 
transportation and distribution of supplies in Turkey.  
 Several organizations are mentioned by name in these 
articles including the Red Cross, Armenian Atrocities Committee, 
American Committee for Armenian and Syrian Relief, and Armenian 
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and Syrian colonies of Washington. All but one of the articles 
were printed in 1916, with the first reporting on the initial 
funds being forwarded to Morgenthau for refugees.164 The rest of 
the articles were published in the fall 1916, primarily 
regarding a nation-wide relief day to raise money for the 
Armenians. While the government issued a proclamation 
designating a relief day, private organizations were responsible 
for its implementation. Both the Red Cross and the American 
Committee for Armenian and Syrian Relief took a large role in 
organizing the collections of goods. Several articles mentioned 
meetings in Washington, D.C. to arrange locations and volunteers 
to collect goods.165  
 A fourth sub-topic theme is diplomacy in the relief effort. 
As previously mentioned, private relief organizations dealt with 
the logistics of transporting and distributing supplies, at 
times in collaboration with the United States Navy. Negotiating 
the distribution of supplies in Turkey was the responsibility of 
the State Department and so required government action. Three 
articles in September and October 1916 reported on the struggles 
in gaining Turkish acceptance of relief aid to refugees. In 
September Turkey overturned its early decision to deny shipments 
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of aid, at first saying they were not necessary. Instead Turkey 
allowed distribution of supplies, provided it took place in the 
port of Beirut through the Red Cross and Red Crescent societies. 
The Turkish government did not allow for distribution in 
Armenia.166  
 Diplomatic negotiations concerning aid also extended to the 
Allies, as the United States needed permission to cross the 
Allied naval blockade to deliver the supplies. One article 
mentioned hope for Allied cooperation “as the French government 
has been anxious to get such supplies through and may itself 
contribute.”167 Days later a similar story reported the Allies 
accepted the proposal and agreed to allow relief supplies to 
pass through the blockade.168 Diplomacy issues in delivering aid 
required team work between private organizations and the United 
States government.  
 The final sub-topic theme is civilian relief efforts. 
Civilian relief efforts are similar to the role of private 
organizations in that it does not pertain to political action 
and the government’s role. Civilian efforts include articles on 
people giving to the relief effort, working as volunteers and as 
part of religious organizations in promoting the cause of the 
Armenians. Articles including this theme mainly reported on the 
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events of the Armenian Relief Day ordered by the government. It 
took place in October 1916, the same month when the majority of 
articles in the aid category were printed.  
 For three weeks leading up to the Armenian Relief Days on 
October 21 and 22, the Post printed seven articles detailing the 
plans to raise funds in the Washington, D.C. area. Religious 
organizations were instrumental in assembling volunteers and 
publicizing the need for contribution. Ministers from four large 
churches vowed to preach on the need for assistance to the 
Armenians. They also asked for businessmen to offer space in 
their place of business for booths and female volunteers to work 
at collection booths to accept donated items and money. Some 
churches also took up a special collection on October 22 or 
donated all the money collected during service.169   
 Social status was an element of the relief efforts as 
volunteerism was considered acceptable for upper class women. 
The Post headlines read “Society Girls in War Effort” and 
reports paid special attention to the “girls and matrons” 
volunteering for service. Multiple articles name the women in 
charge of the plans and two articles give the full names of 
every female volunteer, along with her address.170  
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 Articles reporting on the events of the Armenian Relief 
Days reflect a localized view of the relief efforts. Stories 
center on the work of local churches and community members with 
little attention to nation-wide efforts. Several articles name 
the churches and businesses who participated in collecting money 
and tallies from the local organizations on the amount of funds 
received.171 Only one article mentioned the larger relief 
efforts, saying the “Capital held its own with other 
metropolitan centers and substantial sums were collected on the 
day set aside by President Wilson as Armenian relief day,” 
although it did not include a source or any further 
information.172  
 
Subordinate Reference 
 The subordinate reference category is one of the most 
widely varied categories. It includes all articles in which the 
main topic of the story is not related the Armenian Genocide or 
the Armenian people. Instead, mention of the Armenians comprises 
a minor sub-note within the article, in some cases only a single 
sentence or phrase. In this category, reference to the Armenians 
was only a small component in the overall topic of the article, 
and the Armenians were used as supporting evidence in an 
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argument or as an example of one group out of many affected by 
the war. As the main topics of the articles in this category 
vary so widely, it contains fewer shared sub-topic themes. There 
are four themes: international plans for the future of the 
Armenians, the massacre of Armenians as supporting evidence for 
ulterior agendas, correlations between the Armenians and 
military affairs, and Armenians in the context of the political 
climate in Turkey.  
 The subordinate reference category has a total of thirty-
six articles, nineteen in 1915 and seventeen in 1916. 
Publication of the articles was as sporadic as the main topics. 
The articles are present in seventeen of the twenty-four months 
surveyed, with August 1915 and December 1916 sharing the highest 
number of five articles. There are few trends in a publication 
of subordinate reference articles, the most revealing trend 
being front page and headline articles. This category has nine 
front page articles, all of which are headline articles, located 
above the fold, making it the most conspicuous of all the 
categories. While the articles’ main topics vary, it is clear 
from their prominent placement that the Armenians made it into 
more headline articles as a side note than as the main topic. 
(Refer to Table 2 and Table 6).  
 The first sub-topic theme in this category is international 
plans for the future of the Armenians. Four articles included 
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reference to discussions or plans for the future of Armenia. Two 
articles, the first in April 1915 and the second in December 
1916, are similar in that they reported on international 
agreements between the Entente Powers. The front page, headline 
articles in April entitled “Sees End of Turkey,” covered a 
written agreement between France, Great Britain, and Russia. The 
agreement conceded the future dissolution of the Ottoman Empire 
and proposed an autonomous Armenia “under the suzerainty of 
Russia.”173 Similarly, an article over a year later told of a 
reply by the Entente Powers to a communication from Germany. In 
it the Allies proposed peace terms that included a Russian 
sphere of influence over the Armenians.174  
 Two further articles described the proceedings of an 
international conference on self determination for oppressed 
nationalities that included hearings as to the future of the 
Armenians. The conference was meant to “plan for the development 
of an American international policy toward oppressed or 
dependent nationalities through their representatives in 
America.”175 The conference heard speakers on behalf of numerous 
minorities throughout Europe including the Jews, Serbians, 
Belgians, Poles, and Ukrainians, who all pleaded for American 
influence in granting them independence. Both articles 
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summarized a selection of the conference’s hearings and quoted 
famous speakers yet never any concerning the Armenians. Instead, 
they only mentioned the Armenians as one of many groups 
receiving consideration and do not pay further attention to the 
distinct future of Armenia.176  
 The previous articles contained some of the only references 
in the Post relating to the post-war future of Armenia, and then 
they are only alluded to as part of larger international 
negotiations. Specific description of the Allies’ plans for the 
future of Armenia always named Russia as a guardian to an 
autonomous, not independent, region, reinforcing Russia’s 
historical interest in Asia Minor and the Turkish Straits. In 
addition, Russia’s principal role suggested reluctance on the 
part the other Allied Powers to commit protection to a free 
Armenia in the post-war balance of power. International 
conferences debating the future of many of Europe’s oppressed 
minorities illustrate the large number of peoples asking for 
assistance and the many potential obligations the Great Powers 
would encounter if they upheld the ideal of self-determination 
at subsequent peace conferences.  
 The second sub-topic theme is the use of the Armenian 
massacres as supporting evidence for ulterior motives; there are 
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six articles. The first, in March 1915, reprinted an essay 
written by Viscount Bryce, former British Ambassador to the 
United States, on his views of American public opinion on the 
nations at war. In the article, Bryce argued the American people 
favored the cause of the Allies against the militarism of 
Germany. He cited examples such as the American protection of 
English subjects in belligerent countries and American efforts 
at providing relief in Armenia and Palestine to the victims of 
the Central Powers excesses as proof that Americans prefer the 
Allies.177  
 A similar article used the Armenians in an argument on the 
German violations of submarine warfare. It claimed Germany 
violated humane morals and American rights in the destruction of 
property and safety. The article argued the American people 
abhor all forms of inhumanity, including the massacre of the 
Armenians, not just humanitarian violations by Germany.178  
 Two related articles recounted speeches by British leaders, 
one condemning German control over Turkey and the other 
criticizing President Wilson’s foreign policy. In both, 
knowledge of Armenian suffering was used to condemn the actions 
of an international power. In “Fears Prolonged War,” Premier 
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Asquith claimed “that by lifting a finger Germany might have 
arrested the Armenian horrors” in a warning against a German 
controlled Turkey in the post-war international balance of 
power.179 Likewise, in a speech attacking American policy, the 
dean of Westminster blamed President Wilson for his compliance 
in the Armenian persecutions.180  
 The final two articles, both appearing as front page, 
headline news, reported on speeches given by former president 
Theodore Roosevelt, condemning the Wilson administration’s 
neutrality. In them Roosevelt said he was shamed by United 
States inaction, and that the United States had “been no use to 
the Armenians,”181 and had clung to the “most selfish neutrality 
...at the expense of the Belgians and the Armenians”.182 
Roosevelt used the vulnerability of weak countries or peoples as 
a way to criticize American isolationism.   
 In these examples, the Armenians and their suffering was 
used to support ulterior agendas, primarily to condemn the 
German government and support United States entry into the war 
on the side of the Allies. In each case, the Armenians became a 
piece of evidence, a tool to make a point. The articles placed 
the Armenian persecutions into the larger perspective of a 
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global war in which many groups of people suffered as a 
consequence. While none of the articles actively diminished the 
plight of the Armenians, neither did they propose action to 
specifically aid the Armenians, with the exception of American 
entry into the war.  
 The third sub-topic theme involves correlations between the 
Armenians and military affairs. As previously discussed, some 
formerly reviewed articles in an earlier category reported on a 
connection between military engagements and the spread or 
severity of massacres. This sub-topic theme has similarities and 
differences to those previously reviewed articles, in that while 
a connection exists, it did not necessarily denote a military 
engagement.  
 Several articles reported on military encounters and their 
impact on the Armenians. One focused on the lack of media 
attention paid to fighting occurring outside of the major 
theaters of war, including the Caucasus. It addressed the 
success of the Russian military in the region and the attacks by 
Kurdish irregulars against the Armenians.183 Similarly, two  
additional articles reported on Russian military successes in 
relation to the Armenians, stating the Russian military took 
into account the Armenian population when maneuvering in the 
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region so as not to expose them to Turkish revenge.184 The 
Russian army also vowed to relieve Armenian suffering and 
execute Turkish civil officers responsible for implementing 
massacres.185  
 In further examples, two stories addressed the Armenians in 
correlation with the military in a different way. One covered a 
session of the Russian Duma addressing war needs and praised the 
Armenians for their courage of spirit in facing the persecutions 
and fighting back by joining the Russian army as volunteers.186 
Another cited a statement by the Turkish embassy to refute 
rumors of defeats and named Russian military failures in 
Anatolia as the source behind Armenian uprisings. It said the 
Russian army exploited Armenian peasants and encouraged them to 
rebel when the Russian army failed to push back the Turks.187  
 Articles covering military issues are varied in their 
reference to the Armenians. Some contain references similar to 
other articles, drawing a connection between military 
engagements and the Armenian persecutions. More interesting are 
the articles citing the existence of Armenian volunteers to the 
Russian army, and Turkish accusation of Russian interference in 
inciting Armenian rebellions. In the first instance, the 
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existence of Armenian volunteers would corroborate the Ottoman 
charge that the Armenians were traitorously cooperating with the 
Russian enemy and consequently legitimize the Turkish decision 
to deport them away from the front lines. In the second case, 
the Armenians were seen as pawns in an international ploy to 
force the Turkish government to suppress the Armenians and 
become the villain. The American public had to weigh these 
images of the Armenians against other media coverage when 
developing an opinion of the Armenian Genocide.  
 The fourth sub-topic theme is the Armenians in the context 
of the political climate in Turkey. The subordinate reference 
category has a large number of articles covering the political 
situation in Turkey, most of which were negative. Articles 
reported on a situation in Turkey, citing numerous clues as to a 
worsening crisis. As evidence they described the spread of 
espionage, Turkish secret police efforts in censoring free 
speech, and criticism of the government. They reported the Young 
Turk party was reduced to a political figure head by the secret 
committee of elite members who launched a “reign of terror” 
against their political opponents.188 Other stories stated the 
Turkish army suffered from sedition “spreading among the 
                                                
 
188
 “Young Turks Open Reign of Terror,” Washington Post, July 13, 1915, 
1.  
 106
regiments of the garrison,” and government officials feared 
assassination attempts.189  
 References to Armenians in this context varied. In most 
cases the articles reported on the continuing persecution of 
Armenians. They tied the deteriorating political climate to 
persecution of Christians, who became the targets of Turkish 
secret police, and Young Turk attempts to foment anti-Christian 
agitation.190 In multiple stories, Armenian persecution was 
compared to threats of similar treatment against Greek 
Christians.191 In one rare case, a story reporting on the 
vulnerable condition of the Turkish army mentioned dismissal of 
a religious figure in the government for criticizing the 
persecution of Armenians.192  
 References to Armenians in this circumstance were so varied 
they do not constitute a significant perspective. The stories 
are more cohesive in their coverage of political crisis in 
Turkey than they were in tying it to Armenian persecutions. 
Articles in this sub-topic theme also repeated themes 
articulated in more depth in other categories, namely the 
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presence of anti-Christian sentiment and massacre of Armenians. 
The fact that coverage referred to the Armenians within stories 
on Turkish struggles drew a correlation between them. It implied 
Turkish persecution of Armenians was a manifestation of the 
deteriorating circumstances in Turkey and further suggested the 
Armenians became a scapegoat for Turkish military defeats and 
civilian suffering.  
 As references to Armenians in the articles of this category 
were minor, often merely a phrase, their contribution to an 
understanding of the Armenian Genocide in the eyes of the 
American public can also only be minor. The main topic of the 
articles would have had a much more significant impact than any 
minor sub-topics, of which the Armenians were one of many. 
Portrayal of Armenians in this category were most valuable for 
the ways in which they substantiated themes in other categories 
and to understand that political figures used the Armenians as 
evidence to support their agendas.  
 
Location 
 The final category is location. It includes all the 
articles that make use of the word “Armenia” or “Armenian” as a 
location or a description of a location. These articles do not 
contain any information on the persecution of Armenians, 
international action concerning the massacres, or aid to 
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refugees. They primarily concern military movements and are 
included for analysis as they are useful references on dates and 
locations of military engagements to compare with the spread or 
severity of massacres.  
 This category contains a total of ten articles. The 
articles are sporadically dispersed throughout the twenty-four 
month period of survey, beginning in February 1915 and ending in 
December 1916 including two front page articles but no headline 
news. (Refer to Table 2 and Table 6).  
 Nine of the ten articles report on military engagements in 
Armenia. The first sub-topic theme is early Turkish military 
success in Armenia. The first of three articles with this theme 
was printed in February 1915. It told of the surprising 
successes of the Turkish army in Armenia, who recovered from 
slow mobilization to push back the Russians. It attributed the 
success to the influence of German military officers.193 The 
second article, in July of the same year, said Turkish patrols 
pushed into Russia to harass Russian outposts. Russia suffered 
losses in its attempt to repulse the Turkish attacks.194 A final 
article printed early in 1916 contained news out of Berlin. The 
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article refuted claims in British news sources that Russian 
forces had taken Erzerum or surrounded the fortress.195  
 The second sub-topic theme is Russian military success in 
Armenia. Six articles gave continuous accounts of Russian 
advances further into Turkey toward Constantinople.  Citing 
information from the Russian War Office, one article said 
Russian forces inflicted heavy losses on the Turks and captured 
Turkish military officers “as well as a number of the rank and 
file” in Armenia.196 Additional articles continued the theme, 
reporting the landing of troops along the Black Sea coast 
region, and detailed information on the Russian advance in Asia 
Minor as part of a three pronged attack to capture Bitlis.197  
 Eight of the ten articles, all on the military engagements, 
came from Allied news sources. Most came out of Petrograd, with 
some from London and one from Paris, with the exception of one 
from Berlin. Five of the articles with information coming out of 
Petrograd cited their source as official statements from the 
Russian war office. Allied news sources were more likely to 
report military successes to boost morale and appear strong on 
the international front. Propaganda can not be ruled out as a 
motivation for publication of articles on military successes.  
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 The last article in this category is unrelated to military 
engagements. It is a Bulletin of the National Geographic Society 
published March 1916. It discussed the city of Diarbekir in Asia 
Minor. As a city strategically located on the banks of the 
Tigris River, it had been fought over by numerous groups 
throughout history including the Armenians. As a result, the 
city suffered a massive population decline.198 This unique 
article presented the military conflict in Armenia outside the 
context of the contemporary world war and instead portrayed the 
region as a coveted, strategic location throughout history. In 
this case, the Armenians were not singular victims but instead 
one of many groups fighting over a region that has suffered 
exploitation and population decline as a result.   
 This category is extremely small and therefore unlikely to 
have had a major impacted on the overall tone of media coverage 
on the Armenian Genocide or American’s reaction to it. The most 
important feature of this category is its lack of any reference 
to the persecution of Armenians. While many articles in other 
categories made use of the words “Armenia” or “Armenian” for 
locative purposes, they contain news of other topics as well. 
These specific articles, coming primarily from Allied news 
sources, purposely neglected any reference to persecutions. 
Articles in the description category note a correlation between 
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Russian military movements and the outbreak of massacres.  It is 
possible that official Russian statements from the war office 
did not want reports of massacres tied to news of troop 
movements, as they might indicate Russian responsibility in 
provoking Turkish persecutions.  
 
Quantitative Analysis 
 
 The quantitative component of the content analysis examines 
the prominence the Washington Post gave to the Armenian 
Genocide. Prominence was determined by using five topics of 
inquiry: total number of articles, total number of editions 
featuring stories on the Armenians, number of front page and 
headline articles, number of stories based on the day of the 
week, month, and year, and types of foreign news sources used by 
the Post.  
 
Total Number of Articles and Editions  
 The Washington Post printed one hundred eighty articles 
featuring the word “Armenia” or “Armenian” in the twenty-four 
month period from January 1, 1915, to December 30, 1916. In the 
same twenty-four months, the Post published seven hundred thirty 
editions of the paper. Out of those seven hundred thirty 
editions, thirteen editions contained more than one article, 
 112
five editions contained three articles, and one edition 
contained four articles on the Armenians. Consequently, only one 
hundred fifty-three of seven hundred thirty potential editions 
covered anything related to the Armenians. (Refer to Table 1.)  
 The Post published articles on the Armenians in less than 
one fourth of its editions in the two-year period. Without 
comparing articles published on another topic, for instance the 
invasion of Belgium, it is difficult to gage whether the 
attention the Post gave to the Armenians is more or less than it 
gave to other subjects. Still, coverage in less than one fourth 
of editions seems to be a small amount. Given the newspaper’s 
anti-war stance while America remained a neutral country, it 
could be predicted that the paper gave limited coverage to all 
topics relating to the war or any issues it deemed might provoke 
American sentiment to favor joining the war.  
 
Front Page and Headline Articles  
 The Post printed twenty-seven articles about the Armenians 
on the front page, fourteen of which were located at the top, 
above the fold. The description and subordinate reference 
categories had equal number of nine front page stories. 
International action was second with five front page articles, 
and location and aid had equal number of two articles. The 
subordinate reference category had nine headline stories, 
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description had three, international action and aid had equal 
number of one, and location had no headline articles. (Refer to 
Table 6).  
 Stories about the Armenians appeared on the front page in 
less than one sixth of the total number of articles, and in less 
than one tenth of stories, the information appeared as a 
headline article, above the fold. It is not surprising the 
description category shared for the highest number of front page 
articles. Descriptive coverage of the Armenian Genocide was the 
most graphic type and the most likely to provoke a reaction from 
readers. As stories in the description category were among the 
earliest printed, its front page articles were prominent for 
both their location in the paper and the chronology.  
 The subordinate reference category shared the same number 
of front page articles. In these stories, the Armenians did not 
figure prominently, and so the articles’ placement can have the 
slightest bearing on shaping public opinion. The articles’ main 
topic had more effect on its position on the front page than did 
information about the Armenians.   
 
Articles by Day, Month, and Year 
 The Post printed one hundred eighty articles in the twenty-
four month period, fifty-two, a little over one fourth, on 
Sundays. Sunday editions of the Post in both 1915 and 1916 
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contained the most articles, in some cases more than three times 
the number in other days of the week. The Sunday edition of the 
Post was the largest, with multiple sections. (Refer to Table 
4.)  
 Of the one hundred eighty articles, the Post printed 
ninety-seven in 1915 and eighty-three in 1916. In 1915, October 
had the highest number of twenty-two stories, and in 1916 
February and October had an equal number of fifteen articles. 
(Refer to Table 3.)  
 
Articles by Source 
 Of the one hundred eighty articles, sixty-seven, slightly 
over one third, did not name a location or city as a source of 
information. The one hundred twenty-three remaining articles 
identified twenty-two different cities or regions as sources. 
Six of the cities were domestic and the rest were international, 
with the exception of Armenia, which is a region. Multiple 
articles cited more than one source, so the one hundred eighty 
stories had a total of one hundred ninety sources. (Refer to 
Table 5.)  
The sources of information for the media in reporting the 
Armenian Genocide is very important to understanding any 
potential filters or interpretations on the content. As 
previously noted, the Washington Post did not have any 
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international correspondents, so it was limited to using 
international or larger domestic news outlets for its 
information. Information often passes through multiple media 
outlets, and consequently potential censors, before reaching the 
Post. In some cases the Post printed articles from international 
newspapers verbatim, and in other cases the information was 
incorporated into an original article. Most articles named the 
city of origin, and in some cases the international newspaper, 
that initially reported the information. The United States was a 
neutral country in the early war years and so had wider access 
to information out of Turkey through Ambassador Morgenthau than 
some countries. Great Britain cut the lines of communication 
from Germany early in the war, so American newspapers had 
limited access to German news sources. With this being the case, 
few news sources out of Turkey or Germany were used, instead 
news came heavily out of Entente countries. Cities used as news 
sources include Petrograd, Paris, London, Rome, New York, 
Tiflis, Berlin, Athens, Van, Tabriz, Basle, Amsterdam, and 
Boston. Most information coming out of Armenia or Persia came 
through Russian or British sources respectively. It is difficult 
to pinpoint any exact bias on the information based on the 
channels it passed through without a detailed comparison of 
story content based on the city of origin, the analysis of the 
media coverage must be viewed with the potential biases in mind. 
 116
CHAPTER 5 
CONCLUSION 
 
 The Armenian Genocide tested the depth and commitment of 
the American ideals of humanitarianism and democracy. American 
efforts to save the Armenians through relief work had its limits 
when it came time to back the cause of a free and independent 
Armenia. During the war, the Armenian cause experienced 
unprecedented popularity as the American public rallied to 
provide relief and aid to the suffering Armenians. At the close 
of the war, the cause of Armenian statehood was swept up in the 
idealism that dominated the peace discussion. Yet the 
“unparalleled tragedy of the genocide lent the impetus, but did 
not inspire a political solution to the Armenian catastrophe.”199  
From the signing of the Mudros Armistice to the Treaty of 
Lausanne, the movement for an Armenian homeland disintegrated 
and lost the attention and emotion of the American public. The 
activism of the relief effort vanished as America withdrew back 
into isolationism and “would seem to suggest that most American 
felt they had discharged their responsibilities toward the 
Armenians through the activities of relief organizations.”200 
American commitment to the Armenians was defeated by disunity in 
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the Armenian independence movement and the growth of 
isolationism in American politics after the war, which tested 
“the relationship between poplar appeals for aid and justice and 
the limits of what the federal government would and would not do 
for a foreign people.”201  
 During the war the cause of the Armenians received 
widespread attention in the United States. Through its position 
as a neutral nation in the early war years, the United States 
had the potential to influence the Ottoman government. The 
American ambassador to the Porte, Henry Morgenthau, informed the 
United States State Department of the persecutions of Turkish 
Armenians early in 1915 and continued as an ardent supporter of 
the Armenian cause for many years thereafter. Morgenthau 
beseeched help from American relief organizations to raise funds 
to assist displaced and suffering Armenians. The American public 
was familiar with responding to humanitarian crises during World 
War I and from the initial days of the war participated in 
relief movements to help the Belgians, Poles, Serbs, and others. 
Morgenthau relayed news of Turkish atrocities, which 
corroborated similar reports from American missionaries in 
Turkey to their organizations. The reaction was swift, fierce, 
and began a chain reaction of relief efforts for the Armenians 
that lasted throughout the war and after.   
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 One of the earliest organizations created in response to 
the Armenian crisis was the American Committee on Armenian 
Atrocities (ACAA).202 The leaders of the committee combined 
Christian ideals on philanthropy and bureaucratic skills in 
fundraising and public relations, a stellar combination. They 
immediately began to publicize the importance of relief 
throughout the United States, aided greatly by the new media. 
Media coverage of the Armenian atrocities played a significant 
role in informing and shaping public opinion and altering people 
to the efforts of relief organizations. The ACAA quickly 
implemented a national education campaign, using pamphlets and 
speakers to incite sympathy for the Armenians, and established 
local committees around the country to collect funds. They held 
mass rallies in New York and Philadelphia and collected money at 
football games in response to continuing pleas from Morgenthau 
for funds. Overwhelming response from the American public 
promoted the federal government to establish a special day for 
Armenian relief to collect supplies and unify the cause. 
Churches across the country used their pulpits, collection 
services, and Sunday school classes to teach people about the 
Armenian persecutions and spur activism. The American public 
rallied around the Armenian cause on a massive scale and the 
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tragedy brought the “status of Armenia closer to the American 
heart than ever before.”203 
 American relief efforts were aided by America’s neutral 
status in the early war years. Relief organizations had access 
to information from consuls in Turkey and reports to the State 
Department to use in its publicity campaign. Additionally, 
consular officials had authority to administer the relief funds 
collected to the needy in the Ottoman Empire.204 Throughout the 
early efforts to alleviate the suffering of Armenians, the 
United States government never threatened military intervention 
in the Ottoman Empire to stop the massacres. The Wilson 
administration clung to its isolationist policy, and never 
viewed the Armenian crisis as “sufficiently important to justify 
an official ultimatum to the Turkish authorities.”205 When a 
declaration of war against Germany became imminent in the spring 
of 1917, American policy toward Turkey and the Armenians came to 
the forefront. The media played a large role in influencing 
American public opinion. Graphic descriptions of Armenian 
persecutions in the media coverage, and corresponding 
vilification of the Turk,206 embittered the American people, who 
favored war with Turkey. Yet, President Wilson faced pressure to 
avoid war with Turkey from the same groups who were working to 
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provide relief to those suffering at the hands of the Turks. 
American missionary groups sought to avoid war with the Ottoman 
Empire to “safeguard nearly a century of American Board 
investment in the region,”207 and not to jeopardize post-war 
missionary work in the country.208 American failure to declare 
war on Turkey allowed for the continuation of relief work and 
tabled the Armenian Question until the end of the war.  
 The ideal of self-determination dominated the post-war 
political climate, giving the Armenians hope in their desire for 
independence. Following the defeat of the Central Powers at the 
end of the war, the popularity of the Armenian cause in the 
United States took on a political air. President Wilson’s 
Fourteen Points “boosted hopes for Armenian self-determination 
to unprecedented heights.”209 Dedication to the Armenian cause 
was grounded in American sympathy for Armenian suffering during 
the war, and a feeling of responsibility to make it right.  
 America’s failure to defend the Armenians and ensure the 
existence of an independent state is due to number of factors. 
The matter of Armenian independence was tied to America’s 
acceptance of a mandate for the nascent country. The American 
public was largely in favor of a mandate for Armenia. Support 
for it was published by newspapers and religious 
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organizations.210 New organizations comprised of Armenian 
Americans and prominent American activists took up the cause, 
the most influential being the American Committee for the 
Independence of Armenia (ACIA) and the America-Armenia society 
(ASS). These two committees differed in their approach to 
securing the future of Armenia, with the ASS favoring a 
mandate211 and the ACIA favoring direct American aid to 
Armenia.212 Conflict in the movement for Armenian independence 
weakened it. The staunch nationalist aims of the ACIA clashed 
with the missionary interests of the ASS, leaving the movement 
“scattered and unorganized”213 and working against each other to 
secure approval of a mandate.   
 The divisions within the movement for Armenian independence 
were not the only factors working against it. The American 
mandate for Armenia was tied to Congress’ ratification of the 
peace treaty and League of Nations. President Wilson faced 
immediate opposition to the peace treaty upon his return from 
Europe in the summer of 1919. Resistance in the Senate was led 
by isolationist Henry Cabot Lodge, who waged a fierce campaign 
to defeat the treaty. Wilson tried to rally public support for 
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the treaty in a tour of the West to educate Americans. He used 
public support for the Armenian cause to promote the treaty, 
knowing “it had been a cause dear to the hearts of Americans.”214 
Still his efforts were not enough. The Senate first rejected the 
League of Nations Covenant in November 1919. The Armenian cause 
was now firmly “entangled in the Wilson-Lodge feud and the 
larger morass of partisan politics.”215 When Wilson submitted the 
mandate proposal the following May, the American public 
responded silently to Wilson’s pleas and Congress rejected the 
mandate resolution, “unencumbered by popular pressure.”216  
 The failure of the American mandate for Armenia marked the 
rapid decline of American support for the Armenian cause. 
Content analysis of Washington Post news coverage of the 
Armenian Genocide from 1915 to 1916 reveals the American public 
had a solid foundation of information about the Armenian 
Genocide. Beginning early in 1915, the Post published articles 
on the massacre of Armenians in Turkey. It continued publication 
of news on the topic in a consistent pace through the end of the 
twenty-four month period surveyed, and undoubtedly continued 
through the break in diplomatic relations with Turkey and 
possibly until the end of the war and afterward.  
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 The Post’s media coverage included graphic details of 
systematic atrocities committed against the Armenians. The Post 
made readers abundantly aware of the suffering of Armenian 
refugees and invoked sympathy by identifying Armenians as good 
Christians being persecuted at the hands of villainous Turks. 
The Post gave a large amount of attention in the media coverage 
to the affect the massacres had on Americans living in Turkey. 
American readers at home could establish a mental connection to 
the massacres when reading about the experiences of their fellow 
countrymen.  
 The media coverage provided Americans with knowledge of the 
international reaction to the massacres. The public knew about 
Allied outrage at Germany and Turkey for condoning such 
persecutions and the American government’s lukewarm threats to 
Turkey to cease the massacres. There is an unmistakable lack of 
coverage on any public outcry for the United States government 
to do more politically to help the Armenians; undoubtedly 
because such pressure was nonexistent. Historical scholarship 
and analysis of the Post confirms a widespread movement in 
American culture to assist the Armenians through humanitarian 
efforts. Yet, sympathy for Armenian suffering did not reach to 
the doors of the Capital building in the form of a powerful 
lobby to insist on American intervention in Ottoman Turkey.  
 124
 The Post’s attention to the Armenian cause included 
extensive coverage on the ways Americans reacted to the news and 
the outpouring of support through efforts to provide aid to 
Armenia. The massive humanitarian movement to raise funds to 
assist Armenian refugees is recounted in the words of the Post, 
alerting Americans as to their efforts of their countrymen and 
inspiring continued action.    
 It is clear the Washington Post paid attention to the 
Armenian Genocide. Yet, the failure of the mandate for Armenia 
proved the fleeting nature of America’s commitment to the 
Armenians. The outpouring of sympathy and responsibility 
provoked and recounted in the media coverage was limited to 
humanitarian efforts and failed to extend to political 
protection of Armenian independence. Today the story of Armenian 
suffering and the abandonment of the Armenian cause is but a 
minor, and often overlooked, chapter in the larger saga of the 
First World War. Americans, certainly the readers of the 
Washington Post, learned about, reacted to, and then neglected 
the Armenian tale so swiftly after the war; it can be no 
surprise that almost one hundred years later American 
remembrance of the tragic events is minuscule. American memory 
of the Armenian Genocide had a foundation in the media coverage 
offered in its most political of cities, but it has eroded over 
time.  
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APPENDIX  
 
Tables 
 
Table 1 
Article Chart in Chronological Order  
 
Title  Date Day of 
Week 
Page Issue 
Number 
 
1915 
1 Armenians Flee to Russia  01-15-1915 Friday 2 14,098 D 
2 Want Stalks Turk City 01-17-1915 Sunday 11 14,100 SR 
3 Turk Army Surprises 02-03-1915 Wednesday 2 14,117 L 
4 Turks Cut 150 Armenians’ Throats; 
Force Fifty to Leap Into an Abyss 
02-28-1915 Sunday R3 14,142 D 
5 48,000 Prisoners in Kief 03-17-1915 Wednesday 3 14,159 L 
6 Hundreds of Men, Women and Children 
are Slain by Kurds in Armenian 
Plain 
03-20-1915 Saturday 3 14, 162 D 
7 Impartiality of US Government 
Proved, Says Bryce, Who Declares 
American People Favor Cause of 
Allies as Representing Ideals of 
Liberty; by Viscount Bryce  
03-28-1915 Sunday 7 14,170 SR 
8 Turkey First Nation to Recognize 
Officially an “Armenian Language” 
04-11-1915 Sunday R4 14,184 SR 
9 Fear Kurd Massacre  04-18-1915 Sunday 3 14,191 D 
10 Sees End of Turkey 04-19-1915 Monday 1 14,192 SR 
11 Turks Kill Christians 04-25-1915 Sunday 1 14,198 D 
12 Died in Fleeing Kurds 04-26-1915 Monday 3 14,199 D 
13 Moslems Slay People in Ten 
Villages, Armenians Send Wilson 
Plea for Aid 
04-26-1915 Monday 3 14,199 D 
14 Appeal Sent to Porte 04-28-1915 Wednesday 3 14,201 IA 
15 Crucified by Turks 04-29-1915 Thursday 1 14,202 D 
16 More Slain by Kurds 05-01-1915 Saturday 11 14,204 D 
17 Russians Pursue Turk 05-06-1915 Thursday 3 14,209 D 
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18 American Missionaries in Peril as 
Turks and Kurds Attack Van 
05-11-1915 Tuesday 2 14,214 D 
19 US Helping Armenians (Real Estate 
Classified Ads)  
05-16-1915 Sunday R7 14,219 IA 
20 Kill 10,000 Christians  05-16-1915 Sunday 15 14,219 D 
21 6,000 Armenians Slain 05-18-1915 Tuesday 1 14,221 D 
22 Turks Suffer Heavily 05-18-1915 Tuesday 3 14,221 SR 
23 Allied Nations Hold Turkey 
Responsible for Kurd Massacres 
05-24-1915 Monday 1 14,227 IA 
24 Missionaries Need Help 06-06-1915 Sunday 3 14,240 IA 
25 Americans at Van Safe 06-21-1915 Monday 2 14,254 AID 
26 Russians Advance in Persia 06-28-1915 Monday 2 14,261 AID 
27 Peril of the Christians in Turkey 
Never So Great, Americans Report 
07-12-1915 Monday 3 14,275 D 
28 Young Turks Open Reign of Terror  07-13-1915 Tuesday 1 14,276 SR 
29 Turks Hard Pressed in Armenia; 
Bitlis Massacre Presages Retreat 
07-13-1915 Tuesday 2 14,276 D 
30 Christian Women Dragged from Death 
to Shameful Slavery (Miscellany 
Section) by Rev. Herbert Whitehouse 
07-18-1915 Sunday M8 14,281 D 
31 Adrianople Troops Seditious; Fear 
to Go to Dardanelles 
07-21-1915 Wednesday 2 14,284 SR 
32 Turks Push 100 Miles into Russia, 
But are Driven Back Near Ardost 
07-21-1915 Wednesday 2 14,284 L 
33 Turks’ Spies Active 07-28-1915 Wednesday 3 14,291 SR 
34 Campaigns of Year Outside the Two 
Big War Theaters (Miscellany 
Section) 
08-01-1915 Sunday M8 14,295 SR 
35 Brilliant Assemblage Present  08-02-1915 Monday 1 14,296 SR 
36 Turks Defy Defeats 08-03-1915 Tuesday 2 14,297 SR 
37 9,000 Women and Children Slain by 
Turks on the Banks of the Tigris 
08-04-1915 Wednesday 2 14,298 D 
38 Turks Kill Thousands 08-06-1915 Friday 2 14,300 D 
39 100,000 Armenians Sent in Exile; 
Massacre Victims Put at 10,000 
08-11-1915 Wednesday 3 14,305 D 
40 Turkish Soldiers Outmaneuvered by 
Russians on Upper Euphrates; Halil 
Bey’s New Army Driven Back 
08-13-1915 Friday 3 14,307 SR 
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41 Turks March on Armenians  08-14-1915 Saturday 3 14,308 D 
42 Moslems Driven Back 08-15-1915 Sunday 8 14,309 L 
43 Van Missionaries Escape 08-17-1915 Tuesday 4 14,311 D 
44 Throw Off Turks Yoke 08-22-1915 Sunday 9 14,316 D 
45 Armenian Land of Ruin 08-22-1915 Sunday R1 14,316 D 
46 No Missionaries Slain 08-22-1915 Sunday R4 14,316 D 
47 Turkish Cabinet Split 08-27-1915 Friday 3 14,321 IA 
48 Greece Near War 08-29-1915 Sunday 3 14,323 SR 
49 Million Facing Death 09-03-1915 Friday 1 14,328 D 
50 14,000 Armenians Massacred  09-09-1915 Thursday 1 14,334 D 
51 Turk’s Army in Peril 09-14-1915 Tuesday 2 14,339 SR 
52 US Aid to Armenians 09-14-1915 Tuesday 3 14,339 AID 
53 Armenians Beg Bulgars for Help; 
835,000 Exiled, Church Heads Slain 
09-14-1916 Tuesday 3 14,339 IA 
54 Turks Killing a Nation 09-19-1915 Sunday 1 14,344 IA 
55 To Send Armenians Aid 09-24-1915 Friday 2 14,349 AID 
56 45,000 Armenians are Slain in 
Massacres by Moslems 
09-25-1915 Saturday 3 14,350 D 
57 50 Tied and Drowned; by A. S. 
Safrastiass 
09-27-1915 Monday 1 14,352 D 
58 Plea for Armenians 09-27-1915 Monday 12 14,352 IA 
59 Envoy Defends Turks 09-28-1915 Tuesday 3 14,353 IA 
60 US Probes Turk Outrages 09-28-1915 Tuesday 3 14,353 IA 
61 Morgenthau Offers $1,000,000 to 
Bring all Armenians to America 
10-02-1915 Saturday 2 14,357 AID 
62 Armenians for America 10-03-1915 Sunday 4 14,358 IA 
63 Greatest Horrors in History Mark 
Massacres in Armenia 
10-04-1915 Monday 5 14,359 D 
64 US Aid to Armenians 10-05-1915 Tuesday 1 14,360 IA 
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65 Armenians Loot Turkish Homes When 
Russians Comes to Rescue 
10-06-1915 Wednesday 2 14,361 D 
66 Wilson Warns Turks 10-06-1915 Wednesday 2 14,361 IA 
67 $100, 000 Sent to Aid Armenians by 
2 Committees in New York 
10-09-1915 Saturday 3 14,364 AID 
68 Look to U.S. for Aid 10-10-1915 Sunday 14 14,365 IA 
69 Upholds Turkish Acts 10-10-1915 Sunday 14 14,365 IA 
70 Oppose Armenian Plan 10-10-1915 Sunday ES 
12 
14,365 IA 
71 The Armenian Issue Vague; Turks 
Hiding News of the Events 
10-10-1915 Sunday ES 
16 
14,365 IA 
72 Turkish Mob Wrecks New Italian 
Embassy at Constantinople  
10-11-1915 Monday 1 14,366 SR 
73 Tells of Armenians Slain 10-11-1915 Monday 14 14,366 D 
74 Goes to Bring Armenians 10-14-1915 Thursday 2 14,369 AID 
75 Views of Capital Visitors on 
Interesting Current Topics 
10-21-1915 Thursday 6 14,376 SR 
76 Telling of Atrocities 10-22-1915 Friday 11 14,337 D 
77 Halil Bey in Cabinet 10-25-1915 Monday 2 14,380 IA 
78 German View of War 10-25-1915 Monday 4 14,380 IA 
79 Doomed All Armenians 10-26-1915 Tuesday 2 14,381 IA 
80 Turks Spare No Armenians 10-27-1915 Wednesday 1 14,382 D 
81 Russia to Assist Armenians 10-28-1915 Thursday 1 14,383 IA 
82 British Accused of Atrocities in 
Reply to Armenian Charges  
10-30-1915 Saturday 2 14,385 IA 
83 Did Not Stir Armenians 11-17-1915 Wednesday 3 14,403 IA 
84 Two Turkish Chiefs to Hang 11-22-1915 Monday 2 14,408 IA 
85 Kill Women by Fire 11-27-1915 Saturday 1 14,413 D 
86 What Father Dakras Saw 11-28-1915 Sunday M5 14,414 D 
87 US Citizen Killed by Turks, Is 
Report 
11-29-1915 Monday 1 14,415 D 
88 US Must Put Duty and Honor First 12-01-1915 Wednesday 2 14,417 IA 
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89 Assail US Inaction  12-01-1915 Wednesday 2 14,417 IA 
90 New Cardinals 12-06-1915 Monday 2 14,422 SR 
91 Anxiety in England 12-12-1915 Saturday 18 14,427 SR 
92 Try to Save Christians  12-12-1915 Saturday 20 14,427 IA 
93 To Raise Armenian Corps 12-12-1915 Saturday 20 14,427 IA 
94 British Intrigue Caused Armenians 
Massacres, Declares German Writer 
12-21-1915 Tuesday 3 14,437 IA 
95 Turkey’s Food, Cotton and Copper 
Plentiful Asserts Moslem Leader 
12-22-1915 Wednesday 3 14,438 SR 
96 Germans Defend Armenians 12-23-1915 Thursday 2 14,439 IA 
97 Bulgars Kill Armenians 12-26-1915 Sunday 13 14,442 D 
1916 
98 American Missionaries Investigate 
Condition of Armenian Refugees  
01-02-1916 Sunday ES2 14,449 IA 
99 
 
Full Freedom of the Seas to Our 
Nationals and Our Commerce 
01-10-1916 Monday 6 14,457 SR 
100 1,5000 Armenians Are Killed 01-15-1916 Saturday 3 14,462 D 
101 Americans and Armenians 01-22-1916 Saturday 2 14,469 IA 
102 Armenians Only Removed 01-23-1916 Sunday R5 14,470 IA 
103 Bryce Sends Appeal Here  01-26-1916 Wednesday 4 14,473 IA 
104 T. R. Ready for War 01-31-1916 Monday 1 14,478 SR 
105 Turks Halt Russians  02-02-1916 Wednesday 3 14,480 L 
106 American Woman Missionary Gives 
Pictures of Armenian’s Fate 
02-06-1916 Sunday 14 14,484 D 
107 Stone and Borah Tilt 02-10-1916 Thursday 2 14,488 AID 
108 Fresh Massacres Reported 02-14-1916 Monday 3 14,492 D 
109 Porte Accuses Entente Powers of 
Enticing Armenians to Uprising 
02-16-1916 Wednesday 2 14,494 IA 
110 Armenian Fort Captured 02-19-1916 Saturday 1 14,497 L 
111 Turks Fight at Bay  02-19-1916 Saturday 1 14, 497 SR 
112 US Warns the Sultan 02-19-1916 Saturday 2 14,497 IA 
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113 Russians Land New Army in Armenia 02-20-1916 Sunday 1 14,498 L 
114 Makes Plea for Armenians 02-20-1916 Sunday 3 14,498 IA 
115 Sultan Says Armenian Rebellion Made 
it Necessary to Remove All to Rear 
so as to Protect Army 
02-20-1916 Sunday 6 14,498 IA 
116 Fleeing Turks Being Massacred by 
Armenians is Report to Rome 
02-21-1916 Monday 3 14,499 D 
117 Armenian People Victims 02-23-1916 Wednesday 1 14,501 IA 
118 Plot to Kill Kaiser; by Marquise de 
Fontenoy  
02-23-1916 Wednesday 4 14,501 SR 
119 Morgenthau Sees Wilson 02-26-1916 Saturday 2 14,504 IA 
120 Russians Take Bitlis 03-04-1916 Saturday 4 14,511 L 
121 War Is No Novelty Here 04-01-1916 Saturday 6 14,539 L 
122 Turkey Appeals for Food 04-09-1916 Sunday ES9 14.547 SR 
123 Million Armenians Killed  04-16-1916 Sunday 13 14.554 D 
124 America’s Aid to Stricken 04-16-1916 Sunday ES4 14.554 AID 
125 Sooren, Most Famous of Armenians 
Who Have Been Persecuted 
04-23-1916 Sunday A12 14,561 D 
126 15,000 Slain by Turks 05-07-1916 Sunday ES14 14575 D 
127 Morgenthau to Speak Here 05-15-1916 Monday 4 14,583 IA 
128 Morgenthau Talks on East 05-15-1916 Monday 10 14,583 IA 
129 Turks Avenge Armenians 06-04-1916 Sunday A2 14,603 IA 
130 Congress Condensed 06-09-1916 Friday 6 14,608 IA 
131 Yacht Sails for Russia 06-17-1916 Saturday 3 14,616 AID 
132 Congress Condensed  06-22-1916 Thursday 6 14, 621 AID 
133 Favor Day for Armenians Relief 06-25-1916 Sunday 17 14,624 AID 
134 $2,000,000 Spent on War Relief by 
the Rockefeller Commission  
07-01-1916 Saturday 7 14,630 AID 
135 Plea for Armenians  07-03-1916 Monday 2 14,632 IA 
136 House for Armenian Day 07-20-1916 Thursday 5 14,649 AID 
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137 Concerning the Turk 07-24-1916 Monday 4 14,653 SR 
138 Holds UP US Relief 07-30-1916 Sunday A12 14,659 IA 
139 New Protest to Turkey  07-30-1916 Sunday A13 14,659 IA 
140 New Envoy to Porte Sees Wilson 07-30-1916 Sunday ES5 14,659 IA 
141 Starving Armenians Devour Dead; 
Driven To and Fro Over Desert 
08-08-1916 Tuesday 3 14,668 D 
142 Armenians Eat Children 08-20-1916 Sunday A7 14,679 D 
143 Patriarchate is Abolished 08-20-1916 Sunday RE7 14, 679 IA 
144 Wilson Names War Fund Days 08-27-1916 Sunday A6 14,686 IA 
145 Cruiser Wreaked 08-30-1916 Wednesday 1 14,689 SR 
146 Wilson Calls For War Relief 09-09-1916 Saturday 10 14,697 AID 
147 Sanctions Syrian Aid 09-15-1916 Friday 3 14,703 IA 
148 Huge U.S. War Gifts 09-21-1916 Thursday 1 14,709 AID 
149 Armenians to Get Food 09-22-1916 Friday 1 14,710 AID 
150 Denied U.S. Relief Ship to Syria 10-1-1916 Sunday 3 14,791 AID 
151 Ask $5000 Relief 10-04-1916 Wednesday 3 14,722 AID 
152 Church Girls to Help 10-08-1916 Sunday 7 14,726 AID 
153 Bryce Appeals for Help 10-08-1916 Sunday 11 14,726 AID 
154 Volunteer for Relief Work 10-09-1916 Monday 10 14,727 AID 
155 Relief Plans Formulated 10-11-1916 Wednesday 10 14,729 AID 
156 Episcopal Convention Opens 10-12-1916 Thursday 3 14,730 SR 
157 War Relief for Syria 10-15-1916 Sunday A5 14,733 AID 
158 Urges Response to Call for Relief 
of Armenia; by Lucy Thoumaian 
10-16-1916 Monday 6 14,734 AID 
159 Society Girls in War Relief 10-20-1916 Friday 12 14,738 AID 
160 Relief Day in Churches 10-22-1916 Sunday 13 14,740 AID 
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161 Relief Donations Large 10-22-1916 Sunday 15 14,740 AID 
162 War Aid by Churches 10-23-1916 Monday 5 14,741 AID 
163 Red Cross Chapter Meets Today 10-25-1916 Wednesday 4 14,743 AID 
164 US Shamed, T. R.  10-29-1916 Sunday 1 14,747 SR 
165 Fears Prolonged War 11-10-1916 Friday 5 14,759 SR 
166 Goes to Feed Syrians 11-14-1916 Tuesday 5 14,763 AID 
167 6,000 Armenians Killed 11-24-1916 Friday 3 14,773 D 
168 Turks Hold Americans 11-29-1916 Wednesday 1 14,778 SR 
169 Marooned Americans 11-30-1916 Thursday 6 14,779 SR 
170 Champion Lifesaver  12-03-1916 Sunday S4 14,782 D 
171 Uphold Small Nation 12-11-1916 Monday 3 14,790 SR 
172 Ask Aid for Oppressed 12-12-1916 Tuesday 4 14,791 SR 
173 Heads Red Cross Again 12-14-1916 Thursday 3 14,793 SR 
174 Armenians Thank Wilson 12-15-1916 Friday 3 14,794 IA 
175 A Resourceful American 12-16-1916 Saturday 6 14,795 D 
176 Start $1,000,000 War Relief 12-17-1916 Sunday R5 14,796 AID 
177 U.S. Turns on Turkey 12-19-1916 Tuesday 3 14,798 IA 
178 Must End Military Brigandage 12-26-1916 Tuesday 2 14,805 SR 
179 Turkish Village Taken 12-28-1916 Thursday 3 14,807 L 
180 Allies’ Reply Ready 12-30-1916 Saturday 1 14,809 SR 
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Table 2 
 
Articles by Month and Category 
1915 
 Description Location Sub 
Ref 
I-
Action 
Aid Total 
Jan 1915 1 0 1 0 0 2 
Feb 1915 1 1 0 0 0 2 
March 1915 1 1 1 0 0 3 
April 1915 5 0 2 1 0 8 
May 1915 5 0 1 2 0 8 
June 1915 0 0 0 1 2 3 
July 1915 3 1 3 0 0 7 
Aug 1915 8 1 5 1 0 15 
Sept 1915 4 0 1 5 2 12 
Oct 1915 5 0 2 12 3 22 
Nov 1915 3 0 0 2 0 5 
Dec 1915 1 0 3 6 0 10 
Total 1915 37 4 19 30 7 97 
1916 
Jan 1916 1 0 2 4 0 7 
Feb 1916 3 3 2 6 1 15 
March 1916 0 1 0 0 0 1 
April 1916 2 1 1 0 1 5 
May 1916 1 0 0 2 0 3 
June 1916 0 0 0 4 1 5 
July 1916 0 0 1 6 0 7 
Aug 1916 2 0 1 2 0 5 
Sept 1916 0 0 0 0 4 4 
Oct 1916 0 0 2 0 13 15 
Nov 1916 1 0 3 0 1 5 
Dec 1916 2 1 5 2 1 11 
Total 1916 12 6 17 26 22 83 
 
 
    
 
Total 1915-
1916 
49 10 36 56 29 180 
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Table 3 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 4 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Articles by Month and Year 
 
1915 1916 
January 2 7 
February 2 15 
March 3 1 
April 8 5 
May 8 3 
June 3 5 
July 7 7 
August 15 5 
September 12 4 
October 22 15 
November 5 5 
December 10 11 
Total 97 83 
Articles by Day of Week 
 
1915 1916 
Monday 18 12 
Tuesday 15 5 
Wednesday 15 10 
Thursday 7 8 
Friday 7 7 
Saturday 11 13 
Sunday 24 28 
Total 97 83 
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Table 5 
 
Articles Sources by Location 
 Description Location Sub Ref I-Action Aid Total 
No Location 7 3 14 23 20 67 
Amsterdam  1   1  2 
Armenia  1     1 
Athens  1  4 1  6 
Berlin   1 1 8  10 
Boston  4   4 1 9 
Bucharest  1     1 
Chicago      1 1 
Constantinople    2 2  4 
Julfa 1     1 
London  13 3 7 7 1 31 
Milan    1   1 
New York  6  3 9 3 21 
Norfolk      1 1 
Paris 3 1    4 
Petrograd  2 5 2   9 
Philadelphia      1 1 
Rome  2  2   4 
Sofia    1  1 
St. Louis    1   1 
Tabriz  2     2 
Tiflis  9   1 1 11 
Van 1     1 
      
 
Total  54 13 37 57 29 190 
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Table 6 
 
Front Page and Headline Articles  
 Total Front 
Page 
Headline 
Description 
 
49 9 3 
International 
Action 
56 5 1 
Aid 
 
29 2 1 
Subordinate 
Reference 
36 9 9 
Location 
 
10 2 0 
Total 180 27 14 
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